Huge decision on political gerrymandering: "We conclude that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts."

That's Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 5-4 majority. You can find the news articles yourself, I will read the opinion and update.

ADDED: The case is Rucho v. Common Cause.

The question here is whether there is an “appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary” in remedying the problem of partisan gerrymandering—whether such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere....

The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and considered what to do about them. They settled on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress. As Alexander Hamilton explained, “it will . . . not be denied that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded that there were only three ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and disposed: that it must either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter, and ultimately in the former.” The Federalist No. 59, p. 362 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). At no point was there a suggestion that the federal courts had a role to play. Nor was there any indication that the Framers had ever heard of courts doing such a thing....

But in Baker v. Carr, the Court rejected the idea that redistricting was entirely left to the legislature. It detailed the "political question" doctrine, identifying 6 factors, one of which is "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards," and decided that, in the context of districts with unequal numbers of residents, the Equal Protection Clause was a source of standards. Later, it said the standard was "one person, one vote" — that is, a requirement roughly equal numbers in each district.

There's still a lot of advantage to be taken in where you draw the lines, but it's harder for judges to discover a standard and manage it. When the lines were drawn for racial reasons, the Court got involved, but lines drawn for partisan reasons were always troublesome. There have been a few cases (described in the opinion), but the Court was always fractured over what the standards should be, and a minority of Justices maintained that partisan gerrymandering fell within the political question doctrine. After more than 3 decades, that minority view has become the majority. It was Justice Kennedy — concurring in Vieth (2004) — who kept partisan gerrymandering from going into the "political question" category 15 years ago. So Kavanaugh replacing Kennedy made the big difference.

Roberts writes, showing some deference to Anthony Kennedy but much more respect to Justice O'Connor (who wrote an excellent concurring opinion in the key case Davis v. Bandemer (1986)):

In considering whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable, we are mindful of Justice Kennedy’s counsel in Vieth: Any standard for resolving such claims must be grounded in a “limited and precise rationale” and be “clear, manageable, and politically neutral.” 541 U. S., at 306–308 (opinion concurring in judgment). An important reason for those careful constraints is that, as a Justice with extensive experience in state and local politics put it, “[t]he opportunity to control the drawing of electoral boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part of politics in the United States.” Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 145 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). See Gaffney, 412 U. S., at 749 (observing that districting implicates “fundamental ‘choices about the nature of representation’” (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 92 (1966)))....

Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of political support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power and influence. Explicitly or implicitly, a districting map is alleged to be unconstitutional because it makes it too difficult for one party to translate statewide support into seats in the legislature. But such a claim is based on a “norm that does not exist” in our electoral system—“statewide elections for representatives along party lines.” Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 159 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).

Partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional representation. As Justice O’Connor put it, such claims are based on “a conviction that the greater the departure from proportionality, the more suspect an apportionment plan becomes.” Ibid. “Our cases, however, clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.” Id., at 130 (plurality opinion)....

Roberts quotes what Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality in Vieth:

“‘Fairness’ does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard. . . . Some criterion more solid and more demonstrably met than that seems to us necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of their districting discretion, to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking.” 541 U. S., at 291.

Roberts continues:

The initial difficulty in settling on a “clear, manageable and politically neutral” test for fairness is that it is not even clear what fairness looks like in this context. There is a large measure of “unfairness” in any winner-take-all system. Fairness may mean a greater number of competitive districts. Such a claim seeks to undo packing and cracking so that supporters of the disadvantaged party have a better shot at electing their preferred candidates. But making as many districts as possible more competitive could be a recipe for disaster for the disadvantaged party....

On the other hand, perhaps the ultimate objective of a “fairer” share of seats in the congressional delegation is most readily achieved by yielding to the gravitational pull of proportionality and engaging in cracking and packing, to ensure each party its “appropriate” share of “safe” seats. See id., at 130–131 (“To draw district lines to maximize the representation of each major party would require creating as many safe seats for each party as the demographic and predicted political characteristics of the State would permit.”); Gaffney, 412 U. S., at 735–738. Such an approach, however, comes at the expense of competitive districts and of individuals in districts allocated to the opposing party.

Or perhaps fairness should be measured by adherence to “traditional” districting criteria, such as maintaining political subdivisions, keeping communities of interest together, and protecting incumbents. See Brief for Bipartisan Group of Current and Former Members of the House of Representatives as Amici Curiae; Brief for Professor Wesley Pegden et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 18–422. But protecting incumbents, for example, enshrines a particular partisan distribution. And the “natural political geography” of a State—such as the fact that urban electoral districts are often dominated by one political party—can itself lead to inherently packed districts....

The high concentration of Democrats in cities means that they get a lot more votes than they need in those districts, but not (in this view) because the legislators were unfair.

There are multiple "visions of fairness" and to pick one, Roberts says, is to make a political decision. There's no legal basis for choosing — "no legal standards discernible in the Constitution... let alone limited and precise standards that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral." And that's what puts it in the "political question" doctrine.

Even if the Court were to pick a "vision of fairness," there would still be a terrible problem applying it in particular cases, Roberts says:

At what point does permissible partisanship become unconstitutional? If compliance with traditional districting criteria is the fairness touchstone, for example, how much deviation from those criteria is constitutionally acceptable and how should mapdrawers prioritize competing criteria? Should a court “reverse gerrymander” other parts of a State to counteract “natural” gerrymandering caused, for example, by the urban concentration of one party? If a districting plan protected half of the incumbents but redistricted the rest into head to head races, would that be constitutional? A court would have to rank the relative importance of those traditional criteria and weigh how much deviation from each to allow.

If a court instead focused on the respective number of seats in the legislature, it would have to decide the ideal number of seats for each party and determine at what point deviation from that balance went too far. If a 5–3 allocation corresponds most closely to statewide vote totals, is a 6–2 allocation permissible, given that legislatures have the authority to engage in a certain degree of partisan gerrymandering? Which seats should be packed and which cracked? Or if the goal is as many competitive districts as possible, how close does the split need to be for the district to be considered competitive? Presumably not all districts could qualify, so how to choose? Even assuming the court knew which version of fairness to be looking for, there are no discernible and manageable standards for deciding whether there has been a violation. The questions are “unguided and ill suited to the development of judicial standards,” Vieth, 541 U. S., at 296 (plurality opinion), and “results from one gerrymandering case to the next would likely be disparate and inconsistent,” id., at 308 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).

Roberts preserves the one-person, one-vote cases (even as he rejects the argument that if courts can do those, they should be able to deal with the partisan gerrymandering cases). One-person, one-vote is "a matter of math." You just need each vote to carry equal weight, and you don't worry about who is voting for what. Just get equal numbers in each district, and the legislatures can draw the lines anywhere they want?

Well, there's still the problem of racial line-drawing. The majority preserves those cases (even as it rejects the argument that if courts can do those, they should be able to deal with the partisan gerrymandering cases). How? Simply by noting that there's "strict scrutiny" for claims of racial discrimination.

Unlike partisan gerrymandering claims, a racial gerrymandering claim does not ask for a fair share of political power and influence, with all the justiciability conundrums that entails. It asks instead for the elimination of a racial classification. A partisan gerrymandering claim cannot ask for the elimination of partisanship.

Roberts observes that for all the Court's involvement in partisan gerrymander cases, it has never stricken anything down as a violation. I taught those cases for many years, and I always asked whether that fact indicates that the Court ought to withdraw from this kind of litigation, and one answer was: We're only seeing what legislatures do when they know there will be judicial review, but if the Court were to the political question doctrine and let legislatures know whatever they did would be the end result, with no judicial supervision, we'd see different districting.

Wouldn't much more advantage be taken? Isn't the judicial review doing something beneficial even if no violations are ever found? They're keeping up the pressure, letting legislatures know they're being watched and they'd better not go so far as to reach the place that a court will call too far. But the Supreme Court majority is more concerned with a court's difficulty making pronouncements about what too far is.

Roberts observes that state courts can still find "[p]rovisions in state statutes and state constitutions" to enforce against partisan gerrymandering. And state legislatures can choose to follow more neutral approaches to redistricting:

For example, in November 2018, voters in Colorado and Michigan approved constitutional amendments creating multimember commissions that will be responsible in whole or in part for creating and approving district maps for congressional and state legislative districts. See Colo. Const., Art. V, §§44, 46; Mich. Const., Art. IV, §6. Missouri is trying a different tack. Voters there overwhelmingly approved the creation of a new position—state demographer—to draw state legislative district lines. Mo. Const., Art. III, §3.

And Congress could legislate. Roberts discusses several bills that address partisan gerrymandering. I observe that today's Supreme Court decision should light a fire under Congress. It's got to stop relying on the supposed role of the courts now that the Court has clearly announced it has no role at all.

The ending of the Roberts opinion is framed on the Supreme Court's most important quote:

But we have no commission to allocate political power and influence in the absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to guide us in the exercise of such authority. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177. In this rare circumstance, that means our duty is to say “this is not law.”

ALSO: The dissenting opinion is written by Justice Kagan (joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor). Kagan doesn't accept that last sentence quoted above — "this is not law." She begins:

For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a constitutional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial capabilities.

To say the standards are hard to discern and manage is not to say that there is no legal right. And it's not even that hard:

The majority’s abdication comes just when courts across the country, including those below, have coalesced around manageable judicial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims. Those standards satisfy the majority’s own benchmarks. They do not require—indeed, they do not permit—courts to rely on their own ideas of electoral fairness, whether proportional representation or any other. And they limit courts to correcting only egregious gerrymanders, so judges do not become omnipresent players in the political process. But yes, the standards used here do allow—as well they should—judicial intervention in the worst-of-the-worst cases of democratic subversion, causing blatant constitutional harms. In other words, they allow courts to undo partisan gerrymanders of the kind we face today from North Carolina and Maryland. In giving such gerrymanders a pass from judicial review, the majority goes tragically wrong....

[The 2010] redistricting cycle produced some of the most extreme partisan gerrymanders in this country’s history.... And gerrymanders will only get worse (or depending on your perspective, better) as time goes on—as data becomes ever more fine-grained and data analysis techniques continue to improve. What was possible with paper and pen—or even with Windows 95—doesn’t hold a candle (or an LED bulb?) to what will become possible with developments like machine learning. And someplace along this road, “we the people” become sovereign no longer....

Of all times to abandon the Court’s duty to declare the law, this was not the one. The practices challenged in these cases imperil our system of government. Part of the Court’s role in that system is to defend its foundations. None is more important than free and fair elections. With respect but deep sadness, I dissent.