"Hegseth is in no danger of rising to the level of mediocrity, but next to some of his Democratic questioners, he looked like Carl von Clausewitz."

"Hegseth’s core populist conviction — repeated ad nauseam — is that the grunts on the ground know what they are doing and the pencil-necked geeks in air-conditioned offices just write nonsense regulations that get in the way. The man wasted years at Princeton and Harvard when he could have learned everything he knows by watching that Colonel Jessup speech at the end of 'A Few Good Men.'... In a healthy democracy people revere great learning on substantive issues; they understand the world is too complex to be captured in bite-size slogans; but they also appreciate the wisdom that comes from concrete experience and know that most hard calls have to be made in light of the deeply held values that have made America what it is...."

Writes David Brooks, in "We Deserve Pete Hegseth" (NYT).

Here's Colonel Jessup:

 

And here's  Carl von Clausewitz:

Here's Wikipedia's list of Clausewitz's ideas:

• the dialectical approach to military analysis
• the methods of "critical analysis"
• the economic profit-seeking logic of commercial enterprise is equally applicable to the waging of war and negotiating for peace
• the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
• the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
• the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
• the nature of "military genius" (involving matters of personality and character, beyond intellect)
• the "fascinating trinity" (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) of war
• philosophical distinctions between "absolute war," "ideal war," and "real war"
• in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited objectives (political and/or military) and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"
• the idea that war and its conduct belong fundamentally to the social realm rather than to the realms of art or science
• "strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art, but is constrained by quantitative analyses of political benefits versus military costs & losses
• "tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science (most obvious in the development of siege warfare)
• the importance of "moral forces" (more than simply "morale") as opposed to quantifiable physical elements
• the "military virtues" of professional armies (which do not necessarily trump the rather different virtues of other kinds of fighting forces)
• conversely, the very real effects of a superiority in numbers and "mass"
• the essential unpredictability of war
• the "fog of war"
• "friction" – the disparity between the ideal performance of units, organisations or systems and their actual performance in real-world scenarios 
• strategic and operational "centers of gravity"
• the "culminating point of the offensive"
• the "culminating point of victory"