The Supreme Court turns away 6 plaintiffs who seek relief after they were used, they say, as child slaves producing cocoa in the Côte d’Ivoire.

The opinion — in Nestlé v. Doe — is written by Justice Thomas, announcing the judgment of the Supreme Court and rejecting "a judicially created cause of action to recover damages from American corporations that allegedly aided and abetted slavery abroad."

In Parts I and II of the case, where Thomas has a majority — Roberts, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett (all but Alito) — he writes: 

Respondents seek a judicially created cause of action to sue petitioners for aiding and abetting forced labor overseas. Arguing that aiding and abetting is not even a tort, but merely secondary liability for a tort, petitioners and the United States contend that “the conduct relevant to the [Alien Tort Statute’s] focus” is the conduct that directly caused the injury. See id., at 346 (a plaintiff who “does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . therefore must allege and prove a domestic injury”). All of that alleged conduct occurred overseas in this suit.... 

To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the ATS, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity.

The Alito dissent is very short. Key insight: "Corporate status does not justify special immunity."

... I would hold that if a particular claim may be brought under the ATS against a natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar claim may be brought against a domestic corporation.