I’m (cautiously) optimistic and (at least temporarily) proud of my campus. At a campus Senate meeting last May (2015), the chief legal counsel gave a presentation on speech restrictions on campus. (We don’t have a law school on my campus, if you wonder why a law prof didn’t make the presentation.)
According to my notes (and if I have some of this wrong, it is no doubt my misunderstanding, not the legal counsel’s), the big takeaways are: (1) It is never constitutional to restrict speech on the basis of content alone; it is (or can be) constitutional to regulate conduct related to speech (for example a curfew for public safety). (2) The ability to regulate conduct does include regulations or prohibitions of speech that is “discriminatory”, “threatening”, “intimidating or harassing”, and “incitement to lawless action” (also known as “fighting words”). But those loopholes are not nearly as big and all-encompassing as many casual observers believe. (For example, the restraints on “discriminatory” speech apply only to speech by state actors, and “fighting words” loophole requires an immediate and direct incitement.)
The legal counsel referred us to the case of Doe v U of Michigan (1989). That university adopted an anti-racial harassment policy in response to a series of racist acts. The policy prohibited (my paraphrase of his talk): stigmatizing or victimizing on basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status.
The court (which court? I’m not sure) enjoined U of Michigan from enforcing the regulation because it was an unconstitutional restraint on speech based on content.
Let me repeat: the U of Mich policy prohibiting “hate speech” was unconstitutional.
The recent action by U Missouri asking that people report to the police incidents of speech that they find offensive appears to be in this category of unconstitutional restraints based on content.
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12 comments:
What are you doing with Lilek's dog?
Give him back, right now.
John Henry
Dogs are always therapeutic. Even when they are biting you, they are telling you that you did something wrong.
John Henry said...
What are you doing with Lilek's dog?
This is why he's "under the table".
And what about Hillary's wig?
From the title I was expecting a parhelion.
Is that a NOOSE hanging from the table? Where's a SAFE SPACE???????????
Warmth!
How about President Dreamy declaring ISIS 'contained', just hours before the Paris attacks?
That would be fun to talk about.
The resident surgeon should stick to surgery.
I’m (cautiously) optimistic and (at least temporarily) proud of my campus. At a campus Senate meeting last May (2015), the chief legal counsel gave a presentation on speech restrictions on campus. (We don’t have a law school on my campus, if you wonder why a law prof didn’t make the presentation.)
According to my notes (and if I have some of this wrong, it is no doubt my misunderstanding, not the legal counsel’s), the big takeaways are:
(1) It is never constitutional to restrict speech on the basis of content alone; it is (or can be) constitutional to regulate conduct related to speech (for example a curfew for public safety).
(2) The ability to regulate conduct does include regulations or prohibitions of speech that is “discriminatory”, “threatening”, “intimidating or harassing”, and “incitement to lawless action” (also known as “fighting words”). But those loopholes are not nearly as big and all-encompassing as many casual observers believe. (For example, the restraints on “discriminatory” speech apply only to speech by state actors, and “fighting words” loophole requires an immediate and direct incitement.)
The legal counsel referred us to the case of Doe v U of Michigan (1989). That university adopted an anti-racial harassment policy in response to a series of racist acts. The policy prohibited (my paraphrase of his talk): stigmatizing or victimizing on basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status.
The court (which court? I’m not sure) enjoined U of Michigan from enforcing the regulation because it was an unconstitutional restraint on speech based on content.
Let me repeat: the U of Mich policy prohibiting “hate speech” was unconstitutional.
The recent action by U Missouri asking that people report to the police incidents of speech that they find offensive appears to be in this category of unconstitutional restraints based on content.
The nice thing about winter is that the sun goes all the way across the room, so black dogs can lie anywhere and get warm.
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