"We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the lower courts over the appropriate mental state for threat prosecutions under 18 U. S. C. §875(c)."

"Save two, every Circuit to have considered the issue—11 in total—has held that this provision demands proof only of general intent, which here requires no more than that a defendant knew he transmitted a communication, knew the words used in that communication, and understood the ordinary mean­ing of those words in the relevant context. The outliers are the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which have concluded that proof of an intent to threaten was necessary for con­viction. Adopting the minority position, Elonis urges us to hold that §875(c) and the First Amendment require proof of an intent to threaten. The Government in turn advo­cates a general-intent approach. Rather than resolve the conflict, the Court casts aside the approach used in nine Circuits and leaves nothing in its place. Lower courts are thus left to guess at the appro­priate mental state for §875(c). All they know after to­ day’s decision is that a requirement of general intent will not do. But they can safely infer that a majority of this Court would not adopt an intent-to-threaten requirement, as the opinion carefully leaves open the possibility that recklessness may be enough."

Writes Justice Thomas, the sole dissenter in Elonis v. United States (PDF) one of this morning's new Supreme Court cases.

The case involves rap lyrics published on a Facebook page. So we get Chief Justice Roberts explaining Facebook: "Users of that Web site may post items on their Facebook page that are accessible to other users, including Facebook 'friends' who are notified when new content is posted." And lots of rap lyrics like: "That’s it, I’ve had about enough/I’m checking out and making a name for myself/Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius..." The federal statute "does not specify any required mental state," but that "does not mean that none exists," Roberts writes.

[T]he “general rule” is that a guilty mind is “a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime.”... This is not to say that a defendant must know that his conduct is illegal before he may be found guilty. The familiar maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse” typically holds true. Instead, our cases have explained that a defendant generally must “know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense,” even if he does not know that those facts give rise to a crime....

When interpreting federal criminal statutes that are silent on the required mental state, we read into the statute “only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’ ”

So... at least recklessness must be shown and whether more than recklessness is required is left until another day.