"The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion."

Writes Justice Kennedy for the majority in today's Masterpiece Cakeshop case:

Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, considered, and decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be different going forward in the respects noted above. However later cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission’s order must be invalidated.

The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.

Kennedy is joined by Roberts, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Thomas writes a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. There's also a concurring opinion by Kagan that is joined by Breyer and one by Gorsuch that is joined by Alito. So that leaves Roberts as the one Justice who adds nothing to distinguish himself from Kennedy. There's a dissenting opinion by Ginsburg, joined by Sotomayor. I'm going to take on the various opinions and will update this post as I go along.

ADDED: Gorsuch writes:

In the face of so much evidence suggesting hostility toward Mr. Phillips’s sincerely held religious beliefs, two of our colleagues have written separately to suggest that the Commission acted neutrally toward his faith when it treated him differently from the other bakers—or that it could have easily done so consistent with the First Amendment. See post, at 4–5, and n.4 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); ante, at 2–3, and n. (KAGAN, J., concurring). But, respectfully, I do not see how we might rescue the Commission from its error....

The "other bakers" referred to some other cases in which the Commission did not find a violation (such as where the baker refused to make a cake with an anti-same-sex-marriage message). Ginsburg and Kagan think Phillips was different because he discriminated against the person (on the basis of sexual orientation) as opposed to refusing to sell a particular sort of product. But, Gorsuch says, Phillips was rejecting selling the cake that celebrates same-sex marriage, regardless of who wanted to buy it. In fact, Phillips refused to sell the same-sex marriage cake to the mother of one of the grooms. And yet, how is a same-sex wedding cake different from an opposite-sex wedding cake? The cake is the same, but the baker knows how it's going to be used, and he refuses to sell because of that. Is that or isn't that a discrimination against a type of person? That's the big disagreement. That's all I'll say for now about the opinions of Gorsuch, Kagan, and Ginsburg). I'll update soon to tell you something about the Thomas opinion.

AND: Thomas (joined by Gorsuch) writes separately to talk about freedom of speech (as opposed to freedom of religion).

Phillips considers himself an artist. The logo for Masterpiece Cakeshop is an artist’s paint palate with a paintbrush and baker’s whisk. Behind the counter Phillips has a picture that depicts him as an artist painting on a canvas. Phillips takes exceptional care with each cake that he creates—sketching the design out on paper, choosing the color scheme, creating the frosting and decorations, baking and sculpting the cake, decorating it, and delivering it to the wedding.....

The Colorado Court of Appeals was wrong to conclude that Phillips’ conduct was not expressive because a rea­sonable observer would think he is merely complying with Colorado’s public-accommodations law. This argument would justify any law that compelled protected speech. And, this Court has never accepted it. From the beginning, this Court’s compelled-speech precedents have re­jected arguments that “would resolve every issue of power in favor of those in authority.” Barnette, 319 U. S., at 636...

States cannot punish protected speech because some group finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, or undignified. “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Johnson, supra, at 414....