Abortion rights prevail in the Supreme Court.

Here's the opinion, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellersted,  PDF, which I've not yet read.

SCOTUSblog summary: "The vote is 5-3; Thomas dissents. ALito dissents, joined by Chief and Thomas.... To make a long story short, the Court strikes down both provisions of HB 2 -- the admitting privileges requirement and the requirement that all abortion clinics have facilities comparable to an outpatient surgical center. The state had argued that the restrictions were necessary to protect women's health. Abortion rights groups had argued that the real purpose of the law was to shut down clinics, making it very difficult if not impossible for women in Texas to obtain an abortion"

That is, Scalia's vote would not have made a difference. Justice Kennedy voted with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Breyer writes the opinion, which all 5 join, and Ginsburg also has a concurring opinion.

AND: The district court judge said that the state's requirements failed the "undue burden" test (which applies up to the point where the fetus is "viable"). The Court of Appeals reversed and in doing so misstated the "undue burden" test, the Supreme Court says:

The Court of Appeals wrote that a state law is “constitutional if: (1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it is reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate state interest.” 790 F. 3d, at 572. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that “the district court erred by substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature” when it conducted its “undue burden inquiry,” in part because “medical uncertainty underlying a statute is for resolution by legislutures, not the courts.” Id., at 587 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 163 (2007)).

The Court of Appeals’ articulation of the relevant standard is incorrect. The first part of the Court of Appeals’ test may be read to imply that a district court should not consider the existence or nonexistence of medical benefits when considering whether a regulation of abortion constitutes an undue burden. The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer. See 505 U. S., at 887–898 (opinion of the Court) (performing this balancing with respect to a spousal notification provision); id., at 899–901 (joint opin- ion of O’Connor, KENNEDY, and Souter, JJ.) (same balancing with respect to a parental notification provision). And the second part of the test is wrong to equate the judicial review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict review appli- cable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 491 (1955). The Court of Appeals’ approach simply does not match the standard that this Court laid out in Casey, which asks courts to consider whether any burden imposed on abortion access is “undue.”

The statement that legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical uncertainty is also inconsistent with this Court’s case law. Instead, the Court, when determining the constitutionality of laws regulating abortion procedures, has placed considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings. In Casey, for example, we relied heavily on the District Court’s factual findings and the research-based submissions of amici in declaring a portion of the law at issue unconstitutional. 505 U. S., at 888–894 (opinion of the Court) (discussing evidence related to the prevalence of spousal abuse in determining that a spousal notification provision erected an undue burden to abortion access). And, in Gonzales the Court, while pointing out that we must review legislative “factfinding under a deferential standard,” added that we must not “place dispositive weight” on those “findings.” 550 U. S., at 165. Gonzales went on to point out that the “Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Although there we upheld a statute regulating abortion, we did not do so solely on the basis of legislative findings explicitly set forth in the statute, noting that “evidence presented in the District Courts contradicts” some of the legislative findings. Id., at 166. In these circumstances, we said, “[u]ncritical deference to Congress’ factual findings . . . is inappropriate.” Ibid.