"The court’s brief, five-paragraph order indicated that 'Texas is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the District Court committed at least two serious errors.'"

"Moreover, it added, the lower court 'improperly inserted itself into an active primary campaign, causing much confusion and upsetting the delicate federal-state balance in elections.'"

From "Supreme Court allows Texas to use redistricting map challenged as racially discriminatory" (Scotusblog).

Here's the opinion. There's a long dissent by Kagan, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson, arguing for deference to the decision of the district court. Alito writes a concurring opinion, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch:

"[T]he clear-error standard of review does not apply here because the “‘trial court base[d] its findings upon a mistaken impression of applicable legal principles.’” Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 18 (2024). Because of the correlation between race and partisan preference, litigants can easily use claims of racial gerrymandering for partisan ends. Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 335 (2017) (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). To prevent this, our precedents place the burden on the challengers “to disentangle race and politics.” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 6. Thus, when the asserted reason for a map is political, it is critical for challengers to produce an alternative map that serves the State’s allegedly partisan aim just as well as the map the State adopted. Id., at 34; Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, 258 (2001). Although respondents’ experts could have easily produced such a map if that were possible, they did not, giving rise to a strong inference that the State’s map was indeed based on partisanship, not race. Neither the duration of the District Court’s hearing nor the length of its majority opinion provides an excuse for failing to apply the correct legal standards as set out clearly in our case law.