Moments away — we'll be getting the last cases of this Supreme Court term.

The cases will be posted on the Court's website, here. And here's the live-blogging at SCOTUSblog.

Here's Grok's summary of the remaining cases — birthright citizenship, racial gerrymandering, the nondelegation doctrine, Obamacare, access to on-line porn, and parents opting their kids out of woke school lessons.

UPDATE 1: "Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue" — Trump v. CASA. This is the "birthright citizenship" case, but it did not address the issue "whether the Executive Order violates the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act. Instead, the issue the Court decides is whether, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts have equitable authority to issue universal injunctions." Decided 6-3 (in the usual 6-3 breakdown).

From Justice Barrett's opinion: The universal injunction was conspicuously nonexistent for most of our Nation’s history. Its absence from 18th- and 19th-century equity practice settles the question of judicial authority. That the absence continued into the 20th century renders any claim of historical pedigree still more implausible. Even during the “deluge of constitutional litigation that occurred in the wake of Ex parte Young, throughout the Lochner Era, and at the dawn of the New Deal,” universal injunctions were nowhere to be found....Had federal courts believed themselves to possess the tool, surely they would not have let it lay idle."

Addressing Justice Jackson's dissent, Barrett writes: "JUSTICE JACKSON decries an imperial Executive while embracing an imperial Judiciary. No one disputes that the Executive has a duty to follow the law. But the Judiciary does not have unbridled authority to enforce this obligation—in fact, sometimes the law prohibits the Judiciary from doing so. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (concluding that James Madison had violated the law but holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus ordering him to follow it). But see post, at 15 (JACKSON, J., dissenting) ('If courts do not have the authority to require the Executive to adhere to law universally, . . . compliance with law some-times becomes a matter of Executive prerogative'). Observing the limits on judicial authority—including, as relevant here, the boundaries of the Judiciary Act of 1789—is required by a judge’s oath to follow the law. JUSTICE JACKSON skips over that part. Because analyzing the governing statute involves boring 'legalese,' post, at 3, she seeks to answer 'a far more basic question of enormous practical significance: May a federal court in the United States of America order the Executive to follow the law?' Ibid. In other words, it is unnecessary to consider whether Congress has constrained the Judiciary; what matters is how the Judiciary may constrain the Executive. JUSTICE JACKSON would do well to heed her own admonition: '[E]veryone, from the President on down, is bound by law.' Ibid. That goes for judges too."

UPDATE 2: Kennedy v. Braidwood rejects the Appointments Clause challenge to the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force. The members of the task force are deemed "inferior officers," thus not needing appointment by the President and Senate confirmation. This one is 6-3 in an unusual way. Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson join the majority opinion written by Kavanaugh (and also joined by Roberts and Barrett). The dissenters are Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch.

UPDATE 3: FCC v. Consumers' Research — "The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine." Another 6-3 the unusual way — with a dissent from Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch.

UPDATE 4: Mahmoud v. Taylor, 6-3, the usual way. "Parents challenging the Board’s introduction of the 'LGBTQ+-inclusive' storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction." Justice Alito writes for the majority:

The Board of Education of Montgomery County, Maryland (Board), has introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks into the elementary school curriculum. These books—and associated educational instructions provided to teachers—are designed to “disrupt” children’s thinking about sexuality and gender. The Board has told parents that it will not give them notice when the books are going to be used and that their children’s attendance during those periods is mandatory. A group of parents from diverse religious backgrounds sued to enjoin those policies. They assert that the new curriculum, combined with the Board’s decision to deny opt outs, impermissibly burdens their religious exercise. 

Today, we hold that the parents have shown that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction. A government burdens the religious exercise of parents when it requires them to submit their children to instruction that poses “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 218 (1972). And a government cannot condition the benefit of free public education on parents’ acceptance of such instruction. Based on these principles, we conclude that the parents are likely to succeed in their challenge to the Board’s policies....

I added the boldface. The school was so out front in its desire to reprogram children. They must have been pious believers... or at least people who felt called to pose as pious believers. 

UPDATE 5: Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton, 6-3, the usual way, upholding the Texas law that restricts access to on-line porn. How do you exclude minors without burdening access for everyone? Here, the state required age verification. "But adults have no First Amendment right to avoid age verification. Any burden on adults is therefore incidental to regulating activity not protected by the First Amendment. This makes intermediate scrutiny the appropriate standard under the Court’s precedents." And the law "advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests." 

Kagan writes in dissent: "[I]f a scheme other than H. B. 1181 can just as well accomplish that objective and better protect adults’ First Amendment freedoms, then Texas should have to adopt it (or at least demonstrate some good reason not to). A State may not care much about safeguarding adults’ access to sexually explicit speech; a State may even prefer to curtail those materials for everyone. Many reasonable people, after all, view the speech at issue here as ugly and harmful for any audience. But the First Amendment protects those sexually explicit materials, for every adult. So a State cannot target that expression, as Texas has here, any more than is necessary to prevent it from reaching children."

UPDATE 6: The racial gerrymandering case — Louisiana v. Callais — will be reargued. Justice Thomas, alone, dissents: "These cases also warrant immediate resolution because, due to our Janus-like election-law jurisprudence, States do not know how to draw maps that 'survive both constitutional and VRA review.'"