SPECTER: I take it from your statement, you wouldn't subscribe to overturning congressional acts because of our method of reasoning.Funny!
ALITO: I think that Congress's ability to reason is fully equal to that of the judiciary.
SPECTER: And you think that even after appearing here for a day and a half?
ALITO, smiling: I have always thought that, and nothing has changed my mind about that.
SPECTER: I'm starting to worry about you.
One thing about this topic that might not be apparent to the layperson is that they are talking about whether the Court should defer to a congressional finding that the matter to be regulated has a "substantial effect on interstate commerce" (and thus fits the commerce power, as the doctrine sets the test). But the congressional findings behind a statute (like the Violence Against Women Act) will tend to stress the importance of a problem and the need for a solution, while the judicial reasoning will focus on whether the causal chain between the problem and the effect on commerce is too attenuated. Both institutions may reason perfectly cogently, but the Court is talking precisely about the legal standard, and Congress's reasoning may not be attuned to that. That's why one can fully acknowledge the equal reasoning powers and still be committed to the judicial enforcement of limits on congressional power. Alito's answer includes this point but doesn't belabor it, so you might not notice.