The Supreme Court is about to hand down its last decisions of the term.

Here's the live blog at SCOTUSblog.

And here's where to get the text of the opinions immediately, starting in a few minutes, at the Supreme Court's website.

UPDATE: West Virginia v. B.P.J.: "Title IX allows schools to provide separate women’s and men’s sports teams defined by biological sex, and West Virginia has permissibly maintained female sports for biological females consistent with Title IX." Kavanaugh has the opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Barrett. Thomas and Gorsuch have concurring opinions. There's an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, by Sotomayor that is joined by Kagan and Jackson, and then Jackson has an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. To what extent is this unanimous? 

From the Kavanaugh opinion: "In short, States are not required to conduct an individual-by-individual comparison of the physical and athletic capabilities of all biological males in order to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny permits a sex-based classification that, as here, is 'not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.”

UPDATE 2: "FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment." The case is National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Committee. Another Kavanaugh opinion. It's joined by the 5 you'd expect to join, and the 3 dissenters are then, as you'd know, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson. 

UPDATE 3: Birthright citizenship survives. Here's the opinion, Trump v. Barbara. Roberts writes the majority opinion and is joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson. Kavanaugh writes an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch all write their own dissenting opinions, with Gorsuch also joining the Thomas opinion. 

From the Roberts opinion: "If Congress intended to limit American citizenship to the children of those domiciled in the United States, nothing in the succinct language of the Citizenship Clause conveyed that design. Words appearing frequently in the Executive Order—'mother,' 'father,' 'lawful,' 'temporary'—are absent from the Clause. For a simple reason: they did not matter. And while the Clause does ensure state citizenship attaches for U. S. citizens in 'the State wherein they reside,” Amdt. 14, §1, the explicit invocation of residence for state citizenship only highlights its absence from the criteria for U. S. citizenship. See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 74 (1873) (a person can 'be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State'). When the principal dissent does grapple with the operative legal text—'subject to the jurisdiction' of the United States—it has little to say...."

Also from Roberts: "Citizenship, then and now, was the right to have rights—to freely participate in our political community. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment extended that promise to 'every free-born person in this land.”' Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 600 (Sen. Trumbull). We keep that promise today."

UPDATE 4: From SCOTUSblog: NPR is announcing that Alito is retiring -- but still has not been confirmed... "Justice Samuel Alito, who wrote the Supreme Court's opinion reversing Roe v. Wade, is retiring, the court announced Tuesday."

Waiting on the Supreme Court.

Following the live chat at SCOTUSblog: "The cases still to be decided: birthright citizenship; the president’s power to fire the heads of independent agencies; the transgender athletes cases; two election law disputes; and whether a geofence warrant violated the 4th Amendment."

The full text of new opinions will be available here, at the Court's website.

ADDED: We have Watson v. RNC:  "The federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days thereafter; nothing in the federal election-day statutes requires ballots to be received by election day." That's written by Justice Barrett and joined by the Chief and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Dissenting are Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.

Next is Chatrie v. United States: "Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information. Justice Kagan writes the majority opinion, joined by the Chief and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch writes a concurring opinion, and Justice Alito has a dissent joined by Thomas and Barrett. From the Kagan opinion:

Consider just a few trips that a person is apt to think “indisputably private”: to “the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, [or] the by-the-hour motel.” And unlike a GPS device, Location History enables police officers to focus on precisely those sites—to see, in a given time block, who shows up. Similarly, Location History—even two hours of it—allows officers to target one-off events of potential interest: a gun show, say, or a political rally....

From the Gorsuch concurrence:

I might have hoped that the Court would have pursued a more traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment today. But look carefully and you will see hints of it at work even in the Court’s opinion. Why is the Court so protective of Location History data, email, and electronically stored photos and calendars? Because, it turns out, “a user reasonably understands” all those things “as his own.” Put another way, they are his effects. And why does the Court hold Mr. Chatrie’s effects protected by the Fourth Amendment even though a third party stores them? Because, the Court says, those effects remain his “even though [they are] stored on Google’s servers.” Put another way, entrusting your effects to a third party for certain agreed purposes doesn’t mean they are no longer yours....

Now, we get the last opinions of the day, Cook and Slaughter, the cases about the President's power to fire heads of independent agencies. David Lat at SCOTUSblog: "In terms of their bottom lines at least, Slaughter and Cook came out as many expected. 'The Fed is different' carried the day."

"The Supreme Court... cleared the way for California to use a new congressional map intended to give Democrats five additional seats in the U.S. House of Representatives."

"In a one-sentence order, the justices turned down a request from a group of California Republicans that would have required the state to continue to use the map in place for the last several federal elections in the state while their challenge to the map moves forward. There were no public dissents from the court’s ruling."

SCOTUSblog reports.

"The court’s order came exactly two months after the justices, over a dissent by the court’s three Democratic appointees, granted a request from Texas to allow it to use a new map intended to allow Republicans to pick up five additional House seats in that state.... The challengers [in the California case] argued that the state’s goal all along had been 'offsetting a perceived racial gerrymander in Texas.'... The state countered... that the new map was not racially motivated. More broadly, it contended, the challengers were 'asking the Court to treat California’s map differently from how it treated Texas’s map, thereby allowing a Republican-led State to engage in partisan gerrymandering while forbidding a Democratic-led State from responding in kind.'"

So both states — and all states — can politically gerrymander to their heart's content. The Court isn't going to look too closely at whether something racial is really going on.

"My guess is that regardless of what happens in Tom’s criminal case, SCOTUSblog will endure."

"Tom scaled down his involvement with the site years ago—if the indictment is to be believed, he had a lot of other things on his plate—and today SCOTUSblog is really run by Amy Howe, its main courtroom reporter, and Ellena Erskine, its editor. I see no reason why Amy, Ellena, and SCOTUSblog’s nine regular contributors can’t continue their excellent and invaluable work. I don’t know—and can’t imagine—what’s going on in Tom and Amy’s marriage right now... If Tom and Amy go their separate ways (or even if they don’t), they should squarely place all ownership and control of SCOTUSblog in Amy’s hands.... And as a loyal reader of SCOTUSblog pretty much since its inception, I hereby volunteer to do anything in my power to keep it up and running...."

Writes David Lat, in "SCOTUSblog Founder Tom Goldstein Hit With 22-Count Federal Indictment/A lengthy indictment accuses the once high-flying Supreme Court lawyer of massive tax evasion—tied to multimillion-dollar poker losses and multiple affairs" (Substack).

Lat thinks Goldstein's future is not all used up: "He’s only 54, and he still has the intelligence, hard work, and hustle that allowed him to launch a leading Supreme Court website and become one of the nation’s top SCOTUS advocates, even though he never clerked for the Court or graduated from an elite law school. And if the allegations are true, Tom has an unimaginable amount of energy: he was somehow able to argue before the Supreme Court, run a law firm, win and lose tens of millions in high-stakes poker, juggle a dozen women, oversee SCOTUSblog, and raise two kids... He also helped develop a pitch for a television show based on his life and career, which got picked up for development by NBC in 2009. The program, tentatively called Tommy Supreme, never made it to the screen...."

But now the story is far more exciting — especially if he's guilty. Lat sketches out possible futures for Goldstein — including "a pardon from Trump." And, interestingly, Goldstein published "End the Criminal Cases Against Trump" in the NYT (last November, just after the election). But if the idea is to produce a great redemption story —  worthy of that TV show — it can't end with a presidential pardon.

The Supreme Court will be issuing opinions this morning, at 10 EST, and perhaps we will hear about TikTok very soon.

 I'm watching the live blogging at SCOTUSblog.

Get your fresh opinions here (on the Court's website).

UPDATE: "So we are NOT getting TikTok today. We will keep you posted (on BlueSky and on the blog's calendar) if we hear anything about a new opinion day or anything else that might shed light on when we might get an opinion."

MEANWHILE: From the London Times: "As the Supreme Court decides whether to ban TikTok in the US from next week, users have already begun flocking to another Chinese-owned app, known in English as RedNote. Xiaohongshu, which directly translates in Chinese as 'little red book,' has surged in popularity in recent days and on Tuesday it was the most downloaded free app from the US App Store. One of China’s most popular social media platforms, with 300 million users, RedNote offers similar short-form video content as TikTok — from beauty tutorials to restaurant reviews — and also serves as an online marketplace... Americans on RedNote have been drawn to the hashtag 'TikTokrefugee,' which had attracted more than 100 million views and 2.5 million discussion threads by Tuesday. In a video message posted on the app, the user Heather Roberts said: 'Our government is out of their minds if they think we’re going to stand for this TikTok ban … We’re just going to a new Chinese app, and here we are.'"

"The chief hasn't announced yet whether its the last day. We'll see if he says anything from the bench today."

From SCOTUSblog, as today's opinions are about to issue.

UPDATE: There are only 2 boxes, we're told, and that means a maximum of 4 opinions.

UPDATE 2: Grants Pass v. Johnson. Gorsuch. 6-3... the usual lineup. "The court holds that the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute 'cruel and unusual punishment' barred by the Eighth Amendment."

UPDATE 3: Chevron is overruled! The Chief writes the opinion in Loper Bright Enterprises v Secretary of Commerce. "Chevron, Roberts explains, 'defies the command of' the Administrative Procedure Act, the law governing federal administrative agencies, 'that the reviewing court--not the agency whose action it reviews--is to decide all relevant questions of law and interpret ... statutory provisions. It requires a court to ignore, not follow, the reading the court would have reached had it exercised its independent judgment as required by the APA.'... Roberts notes that today's decision does 'not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework... including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself...'"  From the Kagan dissent: "Congress knows that it does not--in fact cannot--write perfectly complete regulatory statutes. It knows that those statutes will inevitably contain ambiguities that some other actor will have to resolve, and gaps that some other actor will have to fill. And it would usually prefer that actor to be the responsible agency, not a court."

UPDATE 4: If there are 2 more cases, there are 2 more Roberts-written cases. There's only one more case. The last case today is Fischer. Another 6-3 case written by Roberts. SCOTUSblog writes: "This was a case about whether a federal law that makes it a crime to corruptly obstruct congressional inquiries and investigations can be used to prosecute participants in the Jan. 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Capitol. The question comes to the court in the case of a former Pennsylvania police officer who entered the Capitol on Jan. 6. ... The court holds that to prove a violation of the law, the government must show that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so."

UPDATE 5: The 6-3 in Fischer is not the usual 6-3. Barrett joins the dissenters and Jackson is in the majority. Jackson's concurrence refers to the "shocking circumstances" of January 6th.

UPDATE 6: Headline at The Washington Post: "Supreme Court says prosecutors improperly charged hundreds of Jan. 6 rioters/Supreme Court’s decision on obstruction charge will impact trials of hundreds of Jan. 6 rioters and, potentially, former president Donald Trump."

UPDATE 5: The Court announced that there will be one more opinion day, Monday.

New Supreme Court cases this morning.

Follow the live-blogging at SCOTUSblog, here.

UPDATE 1: "Justice Gorsuch has two opinions today. The first is Ohio v. EPA, the EPA 'good neighbor' policy case."

UPDATE 2: The second case is Harrington v. Purdue Pharma, a bankruptcy case: "[W]ord games cannot obsure the underlying reality... the Sacklers seek greater relief than a bankruptcy charge normally affords, for they hope to extinguish even claims for wrongful death and fraud, and they seek to do so without putting anything close to all their assets on the table." That's Gorsuch, writing for the majority, joined by Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson. An unusual grouping. The dissent is written by Kavanaugh, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, and Kagan.

UPDATE 3: SEC v. Jarkesy. SCOTUSblog says: "The court framed the issue as whether the Seventh Amendment allows the SEC to compel Jarkesy to defend himself before the agency rather than before a jury in federal court. The court holds that when the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial." It's 6-3, and the grouping is the usual grouping. From the dissent, by Sotomayor: "Today, for the very first time, this Court holds that Congress violated the Constitution by authorizing a federal agency to adjudicate a statutory right that inheres in the Government in its sovereign capacity, known as a public right." Gorsuch writes a concurring opinion, joined by Thomas, to say that it's not just about the Seventh Amendment. Also at play are Article III and the Due Process Clause. He writes: "The new law gave the SEC's Commissioners — the same officials who authorized the suit against Mr. Jarkesy — the power to preside over his case and issue the judgement." Yes, the case went to an "administrative law judge," "But the title 'judge' in this context is not quite what it might seem."

UPDATE 4: Finally, it's the abortion case that got leaked yesterday, Moyle v. Idaho. As expected, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted, and there are various opinions. Jackson concurs in part and dissents in part. Kagan concurs, joined by Sotomayor and in part by Jackson. Barrett, joined by Roberts and Kavanaugh, concurring, "agree with the decision to dismiss it because of the extent to which, in their view, the case has changed since they agreed earlier this year to take it up. Moreover, they note, there is now a 'difficult and consequential argument' in the case about whether the constitution would allow Congress to require Medicare recipients to 'violate state criminal law.'" 

AND: In Moyle, Alito dissents, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch.

SCOTUSblog is live-blogging the announcement of new Supreme Court cases.

I'm keeping an eye on it, here.

Lots of cases left, and we're close to the end, so today could be very exciting, but it could also be one of those fizzles. We'll find out soon.

MORE: The first case is a tax case — a 16th Amendment case — Moore v. United States. Thomas and Gorsuch dissent, Barrett and Alito concur. As SCOTUSblog puts it: "Because the couple in the case here never actually received the investment gains that were subject to the tax, Thomas contends, they cannot be taxed as 'income' under the Sixteenth Amendment." In Thomas's words: "Sixteenth Amendment 'income' is only realized income. We should not have hesitated to say so in this case."

AND: "We have the second opinion. It is Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon. It is by Justice Kagan and the vote is 6-3. Thomas dissents, joined by Alito; Gorsuch has his own dissent." From the syllabus of the opinion: "The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge."

ALSO: Diaz v. US. — "It is 6-3, with a Gorsuch dissent joined by Sotomayor and Kagan." "The court holds that expert testimony that 'most people" have a particular mental state is not an opinion about the defendant and therefore does not violate federal evidentiary rules."

FINALLY: Gonzales v. Trevino: "The per curiam opinion agrees with Gonzalez, the woman who was arrested, that the court of appeals took a view of Nieves that was too narrow. Requiring her to provide examples of people who also mishandled a government petition but were not arrested 'goes too far,' the court holds."

SCOTUSblog is live-blogging the announcement of new opinions, expected imminently.

Here.

UPDATE: "We have the third and final ruling of the day, in Garland v. Cargill, the bumpstock case. It is by Justice Thomas, and the vote is 6-3. Sotomayor dissents, joined by Kagan and Jackson.... The question in this case is whether a bumpstock (an accessory for a semi-automatic rifle that allows the shooter to rapidly reengage the trigger to fire very quickly) converts the rifle into a machinegun. The court holds that it does not."

The second case was Campos-Chaves v. Garland. 5-4. "The court holds that the non-citizens in this case received adequate notice of the removal hearings that they missed and at which they were ordered removed, so that they can't seek rescission of their removal orders (issued in their absence) on the basis of defective notice.

The first case was US Trustee v. John Q Hammons. "The court held that the a statute violated the Bankruptcy Code because it allowed different fees for Ch 11 debtors depending on where they filed their cases. The remedy, the court holds today, is parity going forward, rather than a refund for past fees. This is a victory for the government."

Oh! I'd forgotten the Supreme Court is doing new case announcements this morning!

They haven't started yet, but the 5-minute-warning buzzer just sounded.

Watch the roll out of new cases at SCOTUSblog, here.

1. "The Court holds that both the free exercise and free speech clauses protect [a coach's] right to pray at midfield following high school football games." Here's the opinion, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. From the syllabus of the opinion:

SCOTUSblog has just gone live, covering the Supreme Court's case announcements.

Here.

Nine cases still remain to be decided, with more opinions coming a half hour from now.... 

I am not expecting all nine remaining opinions to be issued today. But I think there is an outside chance we get the press release at the end telling us that the next session will be the last, when the court would announce all remaining opinions "ready" from this term.

ADDED: The first case, Becerra, is too complicated to discuss here. It's about Medicare payments. But it's interesting that it's a 5-4 case, written by Kagan and joined by Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor and Barrett. It's only the second case this term where Roberts and Kavanaugh haven't been in the majority. If Kagan is writing, that means she was assigned the task by Thomas (the senior Justice in the majority).

AND: Roe and Casey are overruled! 

Alito writes — here.

Roberts concurs.

"Thomas writes separately to reiterate his view that the due process clause also does not protect a right to an abortion."

"On Monday, June 13, we will be live blogging as the court releases orders from the June 9 conference and opinions in one or more argued cases from the current term."

 Let's hang out at SCOTUSblog.

1. "The court has denied cert in a case I was watching, T.O. v. Fort Bend Independent School District, about excessive force used by a school official on a first grader. (A chokehold.)"

2. From a commenter there: "As someone who commutes by bike around the Capitol and SCOTUS every day, I can't overstate how big the police presence was this morning compared to normal. Just scores of MPD and Capitol Police stacked up all around the neighborhood near the Court." 

3. "2 down, 27 to go"

4.  The announcements are over. Nothing big happened. You can go to the link to read about the small handful of new cases.

"More than 140 amicus briefs were filed in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the potentially momentous abortion case concerning a Mississippi law banning abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy."

"The briefs come from professors, politicians, states, and interest groups from across the ideological spectrum. We reviewed them all, identified some of the most noteworthy and novel arguments, and summarized them.... Numerous groups attack the viability standard that the court adopted in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.... Many amici focus on the principle of stare decisis – and urge the court not to follow it in this case....  Twenty-four states... criticize the court’s 'erroneous and constantly changing abortion precedent.'... Twelve governors write... that the court’s abortion precedent represents an 'intrusion into the sovereign sphere of the States.'.... Textualism and originalism Professors Mary Ann Glendon and O. Carter Snead write that the court’s abortion precedent is 'completely untethered' from the text, history, and tradition of the Constitution....  The Thomas More Society argues that the right to reproductive freedom is not supported by history or legal tradition.... A brief from the Susan B. Anthony List and 79 women [argues]... 'there is no longer a need — if there ever was — for this Court to assume that women cannot adequately protect their own interests through state political processes'.... The American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists argues that the Mississippi legislature was correct to conclude that abortions performed after 15 weeks pose 'significant physical and psychological risks' to the patient.... Medical ethics The Christian Medical & Dental Associations argue that performing abortions violates a physician’s duty to protect life and avoid doing harm.... The Pacific Justice Institute suggests that abortion violates the 13th Amendment’s prohibition of slavery. 'When aborting her fetus, a mother treats her child as slave property'...."

From "We read all the amicus briefs in Dobbs so you don’t have to" at SCOTUSblog. The oral argument is today, at 10 Eastern Time. You'll be able to listen to the audio here.

From the summary of amicus briefs supporting abortion rights:

"A Texas law that bans abortions anytime a fetal heartbeat is detected will 'immediately and catastrophically reduce abortion access in Texas' if it is allowed to take effect on Wednesday..."

"... a group of abortion providers told the Supreme Court on Monday. They asked the justices to intervene on an emergency basis and block the enforcement of the law while a challenge to its constitutionality is litigated in the lower courts.... [T]he Texas case that rocketed to the court on Monday, known as Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, involves an abortion law that... bars doctors from performing abortions once they can detect a fetal heartbeat, including the kind of cardiac activity that occurs at roughly the sixth week of pregnancy. The law also allows private individuals to bring lawsuits against anyone who provides or 'aids and abets' an abortion. Individuals who bring successful lawsuits are entitled to collect $10,000 or more from individuals who are found to have violated the law.... Even Texas acknowledges that pre-viability bans on abortion conflict with Supreme Court precedent, the challengers argue...."

Writes Amy Howe at SCOTUSblog.

"But it may have been Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who coaches his daughter’s basketball team and who tried out unsuccessfully for the basketball team at Yale..."

"... when he was an undergraduate there, whose questions and comments were most hostile to the NCAA. Kavanaugh told [NCAA lawyer Seth] Waxman that he was starting from the premise that U.S. antitrust laws 'should not be a cover for exploitation of the student-athletes.' Kavanaugh then summarized the case as one in which the schools were conspiring with their competitors 'to pay no salaries to the workers who are making the schools billions of dollars on the theory that consumers want the schools to pay their workers nothing.' Such a scenario, Kavanaugh concluded, 'seems entirely circular and even somewhat disturbing.'"

From "Justices employ full-court press in dispute over college athlete compensation" (SCOTUSblog).

"Today, we must decide whether an employer can fire someone simply for being homosexual or transgender."

"The answer is clear. An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbid.

Writes Justice Gorsuch, and Chief Justice Roberts is with the majority as well.

The answer is clear, because we've got 2 of the conservative justices joining the liberals. Nice work!

I'm reading the live blogging at SCOTUSblog.

Here's the PDF of the opinion. 172 pages. SCOTUSblog explains:

Alito has a long dissent with at least 4 appendixes, Appendix D is full of images of government forms....

kavanaugh [dissenting] ends with: "Notwithstanding my concern about the Court’s transgression of the Constitution’s separation of powers, it is appropriate to acknowledge the important victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans. Millions of gay and lesbian Americans have worked hard for many decades to achieve equal treatment in fact and in law. They have exhibited extraordinary vision, tenacity, and grit—battling often steep odds in the legislative and judicial arenas, not to mention in their daily lives. They have advanced powerful policy arguments and can take pride in today’s result. Under the Constitution’s separation of powers, however, I believe that it was Congress’s role, not this Court’s, to amend Title VII. I therefore must respectfully dissent from the Court's judgement. "

ADDED: From Alito's dissenting opinion, we see how much everyone pays obeisance to Justice Scalia:

The Court tries to convince readers that it is merely enforcing the terms of the statute, but  that is preposterous. Even as understood today, the concept of discrimination because of “sex” is different from discrimination because of “sexual orientation” or “gender identity.” And in any event, our duty is to interpret statutory terms to “mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 16 (2012) (emphasis added). If every single living American had been surveyed in 1964, it would have been hard to find any who thought that discrimination because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual orientation––not to mention gender identity, a concept that was essentially unknown at the time.

The Court attempts to pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation championed by our late colleague Justice Scalia, but no one should be fooled. The Court’s opinion is like a pirate ship. It sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually represents is a theory of statutory interpretation that Justice Scalia excoriated––the theory that courts should “update” old statutes so that they better reflect the current values of society. See A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 22 (1997). If the Court finds it appropriate to adopt this theory, it should own up to what it is doing.

Many will applaud today’s decision because they agree on policy grounds with the Court’s updating of Title VII. But the question in these cases is not whether discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity should be outlawed. The question is whether Congress did that in 1964.

I understand your argument, but right now, I am busy applauding.

ALSO: This does help Trump, of course.

PLUS: Here's something from the Gorsuch majority opinion:

By discriminating against homosexuals, the employer intentionally penalizes men for being attracted to men and women for being attracted to women. By discriminating against transgender persons, the employer unavoidably discriminates against persons with one sex identified at birth and another today. Any way you slice it, the employer intentionally refuses to hire applicants in part because of the affected individuals’ sex, even if it never learns any applicant’s sex....

We agree that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex. But, as we’ve seen, discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first cannot happen without the second. Nor is there any such thing as a “canon of donut holes,” in which Congress’s failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception. Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule. And that is exactly how this Court has always approached Title VII. “Sexual harassment” is conceptually distinct from sex discrimination, but it can fall within Title VII’s sweep. Oncale, 523 U. S., at 79–80. Same with “motherhood discrimination.” See Phillips, 400 U. S., at 544. Would the employers have us reverse those cases on the theory that Congress could have spoken to those problems more specifically? Of course not. As enacted, Title VII prohibits all forms of discrimination because of sex, however they may manifest themselves or whatever other labels might attach to them.

"Last night the Supreme Court declined to intervene in challenges by churches in southern California and the Chicago area to stay-at-home orders issued as a result of the COVID-19 crisis...."

"The court issued only a terse order in the Illinois case that referred to the new guidance issued by the state earlier this week. But the justices were closely divided in the California case, with Chief Justice John Roberts casting the deciding vote and writing a late-night opinion to explain his decision to deny relief. The California case was filed on Tuesday by the South Bay United Pentecostal Church, which is located in Chula Vista, California – just south of San Diego. The church argued that the reopening plan outlined by California Governor Gavin Newsom and San Diego County discriminated against houses of worship by keeping them closed while allowing retail stores, offices, restaurants and schools to open.... At approximately 6:30 p.m. ET, the justices turned down the request from the Illinois churches without any public dissents.... The justices did not act on the California case until nearly midnight on Friday. Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh indicated that they would have granted the church’s request. Roberts wrote a short opinion to express his agreement with (and to explain) the denial of the church’s request..... The California order at the heart of this case, he observed, temporarily restricts the number of people who can gather in public 'to address this extraordinary health emergency.'... The state has limited the size of similar, non-religious gatherings like plays, concerts and sporting events. Although the state treats activities like grocery stores and banks differently, Roberts continued, those activities are in fact different, because they do not involve large groups of people coming together in close proximity for extended periods of time. 'The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic,' Roberts reasoned, 'is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement.'"

SCOTUSblog reports.

Here's the PDF of the Roberts opinion.

Here's the dissenting opinion written by Justice Kavanaugh. Excerpt:

"ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III, IV–B, and IV–C..."

"... in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined; with respect to Part IV–A, in which THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined; and with respect to Part V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GORSUCH and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part."

That's the line-up on Department of Commerce v. New York, a case that promises to be difficult to read. But the easy take away is that the Court was unanimous. Unlike the non-unanimous case I just spent an hour and a half writing about, it doesn't do something big, clear, and final. It's all fractured. And I need a break.

So let me just dish up Amy Howe's "Opinion analysis: Court orders do-over on citizenship question in census case." Excerpt:

The Supreme Court rules that the cable company's public access channel is not a state actor.

Here's Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, released moments ago. It's 5-4, written by Justice Kavanaugh, and the split is where you'll guess without looking.

From SCOTUSblog:

This was a case in which the public-access channel was sued after it suspended two people who produced a film that was critical of the channel from access to the channel's facilities and services.

Justice Kavanaugh emphasizes that the First Amendment's prohibitions apply only to state (governmental) actors and concludes that the threshold requirement of state action is missing here.

"When an inmate contends that a state’s method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment... he must show that there is an alternative method of execution that would 'significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain'..."

"... but that the state has – for no good reason – refused to adopt. This requirement applies, Gorsuch explained [writing for the majority of the Supreme Court], even though Bucklew is only challenging the constitutionality of the state’s use of lethal injection to execute him, rather than the constitutionality of lethal injection more generally.... In this case... Bucklew had made only a 'bare-bones proposal' to use death by nitrogen gas, depriving the body of oxygen, as an alternative to lethal injection. In Gorsuch’s view, that proposal 'falls well short' of showing that the alternative could be 'readily implemented' because Bucklew had not offered any evidence on what Gorsuch deemed 'essential questions': 'how nitrogen gas should be administered (using a gas chamber, a tent, a hood, a mask, or some other delivery device); in what concentration (pure nitrogen or some other mixture of gases); how quickly and for how long it should be introduced; or how the State might ensure the safety of the execution team, including protecting them against the risk of gas leaks.'...  Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he reiterated that, in his view, a method of execution only violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment if it is 'deliberately designed to inflict pain.'"

From "Opinion analysis: Divided court rejects lethal-injection challenge by inmate with rare medical condition" by Amy Howe (at SCOTUSblog).