"The justices now have eight more opinions to release, on topics ranging from partisan gerrymandering... to the dispute over the Trump administration’s decision to include a question about citizenship on the 2020 census."

Writes Amy Howe, with summaries of the 8 cases.

We're just a few minutes away from the release of new opinions, which will be announced right away in the live-blogging at SCOTUSblog.

UPDATE:

Justice Gorsuch has the first opinion, in US v. Haymond.... The court holds that a federal law requiring a defendant who is registered as a sex offender to return to prison for at least five years if a federal judge finds that the defendant violated the terms of his supervised release is unconstitutional.... Gorsuch writes that only "a jury, acting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may take a person's liberty." But in this case, a federal law required a judge to send Haymond to prison without "empaneling a jury of his peers or requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As applied here, we do not hesitate to hold that the statute violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."...

We have Kisor v. Wilkie, from Justice Kagan.... This case was about whether to uphold the doctrine known as Auer deference, which instructs courts to defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation.... Kagan says the only question before the court is whether to overrule Auer, and the answer is no. But "even as we uphold it," she writes, "we reinforce its limits. Auer deference is sometimes appropriate and sometimes not."

We have our third and FINAL opinion of the day.... TN Wine and Spirits v. Thomas, from Alito. This is the challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee's residency requirements for retail liquor licenses.... The Supreme Court affirms the Sixth Circuit's ruling, which struck down the residency requirement.

ADDED: The last one is in the area I used to teach. It's a negative commerce clause case (made interesting because the subject is the sale of alcohol, and there's a special text, the 21st Amendment). The majority opinion, written by Alito, is joined by everyone except Gorsuch and Thomas. Thomas's strong position against the negative commerce clause [AKA the "dormant commerce clause"] was already known. It's interesting to see Gorsuch here. Gorsuch writes the dissenting opinion, and it's the one opinion I'll read this morning.

From the Gorsuch opinion in TN Wine and Spirits:

Alcohol occupies a complicated place in this country’s history. Some of the founders were enthusiasts; Benjamin Franklin thought wine was “proof that God loves us.” Letter from B. Franklin to A. Morellet (July 1779), in 7 Writings of Benjamin Franklin 437 (A. Smyth ed. 1907). Many in the Prohibition era were decidedly less enamored; they saw “liquor [a]s a lawlessness unto itself.” Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390, 398 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). Over time, the people have adopted two separate constitutional Amendments to adjust and then readjust alcohol’s role in our society. But through it all, one thing has always held true: States may impose residency requirements on those who seek to sell alcohol within their borders to ensure that retailers comply with local laws and norms. In fact, States have enacted residency requirements for at least 150 years, and the Tennessee law at issue before us has stood since 1939. Today and for the first time, the Court claims to have discovered a duty and power to strike down laws like these as unconstitutional. Respectfully, I do not see it.

Start with the text of the Constitution. After the Nation’s failed experiment with Prohibition, the people assembled in conventions in each State to adopt the Twenty-first Amendment. In §1, they repealed the Eighteenth Amendment’s nationwide prohibition on the sale of alcohol. But in §2, they provided that “[t]he transportation or importation into any State . . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” The Amendment thus embodied a classically federal compromise: Nationwide prohibition ended, but States gained broad discretion to calibrate alcohol regulations to local preferences. And under the terms of this compromise, Tennessee’s law imposing a two-year residency requirement on those who seek to sell liquor within its jurisdiction would seem perfectly permissible....

Straying from the text, state practice, and early precedent, and leaning instead on the Amendment’s famously sparse legislative history, the Court says it can find no evidence that §2 was intended to authorize “protectionist” state laws. Ante, at 21, 22 n. 15. But even there plenty of evidence can be found that those who ratified the Amendment wanted the States to be able to regulate the sale of liquor free of judicial meddling under the dormant Commerce Clause—and there is no evidence they wanted judges to have the power to decide that state laws restricted competition “too much.”... Reduced competition and increased prices were foreseeable consequences of allowing such unfettered state regulation, but they were consequences the people willingly accepted with the compromise of the Twenty-first Amendment....

How much public health and safety benefit must there be to overcome this Court’s worries about protectionism “predominat[ing]”?... As judges, we may be sorely tempted to “rationalize” the law and impose our own free-trade rules for all goods and services in interstate commerce. Certainly, that temptation seems to have proven nearly irresistible for this Court when it comes to alcohol.... Like it or not, those who adopted the Twenty-first Amendment took the view that reasonable people can disagree about the costs and benefits of free trade in alcohol. They left us with clear instructions that the free-trade rules this Court has devised for “cabbages and candlesticks” should not be applied to alcohol. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131, 139 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Under the terms of the compromise they hammered out, the regulation of alcohol wasn’t left to the imagination of a committee of nine sitting in Washington, D. C., but to the judgment of the people themselves and their local elected representatives. State governments were supposed to serve as “laborator[ies]” of democracy, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), with “broad power to regulate liquor under §2,” Granholm, 544 U. S., at 493. If the people wish to alter this arrangement, that is their sovereign right. But until then, I would enforce the Twenty-first Amendment as they wrote and originally understood it.