Althouse: "My brother is a big boy. His administration was shaped by his thinking, his reaction to the attack on 9/11."

६ नोव्हेंबर, २०१५

"My brother is a big boy. His administration was shaped by his thinking, his reaction to the attack on 9/11."

"I think my dad, like a lot of people that love George, want to try to create a different narrative, perhaps, just because that’s natural to do."

Said Jeb Bush, who's trying to run for President and has to deal with his very elderly father saying some awkwardly critical things relating to his older brother.

३१ टिप्पण्या:

CStanley म्हणाले...: Everything about Jeb seems awkward, including his posture in the TV ad he's runnng.; ६/११/१५, ७:४० AM
rhhardin म्हणाले...: My administration was shaped by an interest in high school level physics.; ६/११/१५, ७:४१ AM
Beloved Commenter AReasonableMan म्हणाले...: Bush Sr simply stated what a large fraction of the population, on both sides of the partisan divide, already believes.; ६/११/१५, ७:४२ AM
Bay Area Guy म्हणाले...: Jeb! appears to be toast!; ६/११/१५, ८:४७ AM
Peter म्हणाले...: For better or worse, Jeb has the stink of "loser" on him, and I doubt he'll be able to get it off.

When people perceive a candidate as a loser, everything the candidate does begins to look like something only a loser would do.

Perhaps that's unfair, but, electoral politics is about winning, and is ill-suited for those who whine of "unfairness."; ६/११/१५, ८:५२ AM
elcee म्हणाले...: Jeb Bush: "I think my dad, like a lot of people that love George, want to try to create a different narrative"

The NY Times Baker piece points the way to "create a different narrative": the first and necessary step is setting the record straight on the decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The way to set the record straight is by correcting prevalent yet false beliefs about the reasons for the Iraq intervention via explanation of the actual law and policy, fact basis, ie, the why, of the decision for OIF.

Earlier this year, Jeb Bush was giftwrapped an opportunity to set the record straight when he was confronted with Megyn Kelly's 'knowing what we know now' hypothetical regarding the decision for OIF, but he flubbed it. If Bush wishes to "create a different narrative" and perhaps resuscitate his candidacy in the process, he should take advantage of this second opportunity and set the record straight on the decision for OIF.; ६/११/१५, ९:०४ AM
JPS म्हणाले...: I was interested to see Rumsfeld's statement in response to GHWB's comments: "Bush 41 is getting up in years and misjudges Bush 43, who I found made his own decisions."

"Getting up in years" struck me as nasty and irrelevant. I'd bet Bush 41 held the same opinion eight years ago, when he was the age Rumsfeld is now. But the point about GWB making his own decisions is a lot closer to the mark than some critics' charge, or his father's damning "defense", that Cheney and Rumsfeld had this tremendous influence over him. When he went with their advice it's because he agreed with them. When he didn't agree with them, he overruled them (and eventually showed Rumsfeld the door).

As for narrative, GHWB, a decent man I respect a lot, has an axe to grind: namely, that assembling this tremendous coalition to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, making moral compromises to keep e.g. Hafez al-Assad's Syria part of that coalition, then leaving Saddam Hussein dangerous, angry and in power, was absolutely the right call, all the more so in light of what we've seen since. And it may have been - but Bush is hardly disinterested on this point.; ६/११/१५, ९:४३ AM
Wince म्हणाले...: Mr. Cheney, he said, was “very hard-line” and too eager to “use force to get our way”; Mr. Rumsfeld was an “arrogant fellow” full of “swagger.” He used the same phrase, “iron-ass,” to describe both men.

All I've seen are comments are about style and timing, not substance or policy.

Eric said...
Earlier this year, Jeb Bush was giftwrapped an opportunity to set the record straight when he was confronted with Megyn Kelly's 'knowing what we know now' hypothetical regarding the decision for OIF, but he flubbed it.

Indeed. Jeb could have said does "knowing what we know now" include knowing that my brother's successor in office would eventually squander every gain made in Iraq by a precipitous military pull-out?; ६/११/१५, ९:४५ AM
Robert Cook म्हणाले...: Eric...

You forget to point out the original--and more tellingly accurate--acronym for our illegal invasion of Iraq: OIL (for Operation Iraqi Liberation).; ६/११/१५, ९:४९ AM
Robert Cook म्हणाले...: "Jeb could have said does 'knowing what we know now' include knowing that my brother's successor in office would eventually squander every gain made in Iraq by a precipitous military pull-out?"

Heh! That "precipitous pull-out" date was negotiated by Bush.

Given that this Bush-negotiated pull-out date was about 8 years after our invasion, I'm curious what was so "precipitous" about it? Especially as we toppled Hussein's government swiftly, found him belatedly, and had him executed subsequently, what purpose did we have in remaining longer? Especially as the Iraqis did not want to renegotiate the removal of our military unless we agreed to their terms, (i.e., making U.S. personnel who violated Iraqi law be subject to the Iraqi justice system), which we would not.

Given this, we could not have "legally" stayed, (ironic, given that our violent entrance to the country was illegal).; ६/११/१५, ९:५८ AM
JPS म्हणाले...: Robert Cook:

The timing of the status-of-forces agreement negotiated under Bush anticipated a subsequent renegotiation. Bush, for all his flaws, was trying not to bind his successor. Most of his critics would not have been pleased had he negotiated an agreement that kept us there until, oh, 2023. Obama hacks, of whom I've never known you to be one, insist that the date was set by Bush by way of saying it's not their guy's fault that a decision he made proudly, and bragged about, had negative consequences to the region.

What purpose did we have in remaining longer? Well. what do you suppose would have happened to the Republic of Korea if we'd told them in 1958, "OK, boys, we've done about all we can here. Best of luck"?; ६/११/१५, ११:०९ AM
elcee म्हणाले...: JPS:
"GHWB ... has an axe to grind: ... leaving Saddam Hussein dangerous, angry and in power, was absolutely the right call"

Set aside that President HW Bush has stated support for the decision for OIF. The flaw with the view that he had "an axe to grind" about the Iraqi regime change is that, immediately following Desert Storm, HW Bush set the course to regime change for Iraq. He set the policy direction that his successor codified with the Iraq Liberation Action of 1998 (Public Law 105-338). He also applied the first practical steps to Iraqi regime change with the enforcement of the humanitarian mandates of UNSCR 688 (1991).

President HW Bush announcing enforcement of UNSCR 688, 16APR91:
Do I think the answer is now for Saddam Hussein to be kicked out? Absolutely. Because there will not be ... normalized relations with the United States -- and I think this is true for most coalition partners -- until Saddam Hussein is out of there.

President HW Bush letter to Congress on status of Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions, 19JAN93:
We continue to support the efforts of the Iraq National Congress to develop a broad-based alternative to the Saddam regime. We encourage other governments to do the same. The Congress espouses a future Iraq based on the principles of political pluralism, territorial unity, and full compliance with all the U.N. Security Council resolutions.; ६/११/१५, १२:०८ PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Robert Cook:
"our illegal invasion of Iraq"

See the answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal?".

In brief ...

There is no domestic legal controversy over OIF. According to American law, the entire Iraq intervention, including current operations, has been legal.

There is, however, an international legal controversy over OIF. But it was the same international legal controversy, involving UN Security Council procedure, over the no-fly zones and Operation Desert Fox. Substantively, Iraq was guilty across the board of breaching the Gulf War ceasefire. A contemporary comparison is the international legal controversy over the "illegal but justified" Balkans intervention, which also ran afoul of UNSC procedure but was justified on substantive grounds. The difference with the Balkans intervention is that the enforcement of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions with Iraq was initially authorized by the UNSC with UNSCR 678 (1990) then UNSCR 687 (1991).

There is neither a domestic nor international legal controversy over the post-war peace operations that were mandated to "take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq" (UNSCR 1511). As in the occupation following the Serbian regime change, the peace operations following regime change in Iraq were conducted with specific UN authorization.; ६/११/१५, १२:२९ PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Robert Cook:
"Especially as we toppled Hussein's government swiftly, found him belatedly, and had him executed subsequently, what purpose did we have in remaining longer?"

The State Department, in a 2011 statement on the US Embassy in Baghdad website, answers your question:
After a long and difficult conflict, we now have the opportunity to see Iraq emerge as a strategic partner in a tumultuous region. A sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq that can act as a force for moderation is profoundly in the national security interests of the United States and will ensure that Iraq can realize its full potential as a democratic society. Our civilian-led presence is helping us strengthen the strong strategic partnership that has developed up to this point.

As JPS alludes, our long-term national security interest in the well-being of post-Saddam Iraq is in line with our long-term national security interest in the well-being of post-Nazi Germany and post-Imperial Japan and Korea.

Imagine the consequences if the US had withdrawn peace operations from Europe and Asia in the early 1950s and abandoned those still-fragile new allies to the mercy of regional dangers like the US pulled out of Iraq at the 8-year mark. President Obama should have stayed the course from President Bush like President Eisenhower stayed the course from President Truman. Instead, Obama fumbled away the "strong strategic partnership that has developed up to this point" (State Dept) with an astonishingly passive-aggressive approach to the SOFA negotiation.

Negotiating the long-term US-Iraq relationship was intended to be conditions-based, which was made clear in the the Strategic Framework agreement that was agreed upon alongside the 2008-2011 SOFA.

For a short summary of the state of Iraq and the US-Iraq SOFA negotiation in 2010-2011, see:

1. UN Recognizes 'Major Changes' In Iraq (link) by VP Joe Biden on behalf of the UN Security Council.
2. Withdrawal Symptoms: The Bungling of the Iraq Exit (link) by OIF senior advisor Rick Brennan.
3. How Obama Abandoned Democracy in Iraq (link) by OIF official and senior advisor Emma Sky.

For more sources and summary about the failed US-Iraq SOFA negotiation and removal of peace operations, go here.; ६/११/१५, १:०५ PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Robert Cook:
"Especially as we toppled Hussein's government swiftly ..."

The original premise you imply - namely, that deposing Saddam was the end goal - is incorrect.

Rather, the regime change was the means to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) once Saddam failed his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).

The Gulf War ceasefire mandates were not limited to disarmament. Proving Iraq disarmed as mandated was only the first step for Saddam to switch off enforcement, ie, the credible threat of regime change, with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441). Saddam failed to take even the first step required to switch off enforcement when UNMOVIC found "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" in the UNSCR 1441 inspections.

Ahead of and in accordance with our long-term national security interest in the well-being of post-Saddam Iraq, the comprehensive nature of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions meant the process to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" would take time. For insight on the Iraqi compliance goal of OIF, see the December 2010 VP Biden statement on behalf of the UNSC that I linked upthread.; ६/११/१५, १:५३ PM
Kirk Parker म्हणाले...: This makes me respect Rumsfeld more, GHWB less, and basically leaves GWB where I found him: far better in his response to 9/11 than the alternative would have been (Al "Chakra" Gore), but what a f'ningly low bar to have to pass.; ६/११/१५, ३:१३ PM
Robert Cook म्हणाले...: UNSCR 1441 was not an authorization by the UN Security Council permitting us to invade Iraq. Absent such a vote, or an imminent self-defense necessity, our invasion of Iraq was illegal. (Colin Powell urged Bush to put the motion before the Security Council to obtain a vote approving our planned invasion, in order to legitimize our actions. Bush reluctantly did so, but the motion was withdrawn when it became clear the council would not vote to approve our invasion. So, it was illegal)

In fact, Hussein was attempting to comply by allowing in the UN weapons inspectors. They had only completed four months of inspections--during which time they found no WMD or evidence of extant WMD programs. They said they would need another several months to complete their inspections. They were told to leave for their own safety as the invasion was scheduled to start.

So much for allowing Hussein to comply. So much for war being a "last choice." In fact, we wanted to go to war against Hussein from the start of Bush's administration, and 9/11--which had nothing to do with Hussein or Iraq--simply served as the convenient rationale for us to do what we had been lusting to do. Given the mood of the public at the time--panicked, angry, vengeful, eager to point the finger at a designated "bad guy," observing the legal niceties was the last thing the Bush/Cheney cabal cared about.

The whole thing was a sham and a lie...and a war crime.; ६/११/१५, ४:२७ PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Kirk Parker:
"basically leaves GWB where I found him: far better in his response to 9/11 than the alternative would have been (Al "Chakra" Gore)"

That's hard to say, at least in terms of Iraq. There's a strong likelihood that a hypothetical President Gore also would have reacted to the 9/11 attacks by pressing to conclusively resolve the Saddam problem.

Excerpt from the answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)?":
The 9/11 attacks, coupled with the uncovering of an international WMD black market, shifted the threat calculation to a "grave and gathering" threat standard with increased focus on Saddam’s unconventional capabilities, such as the IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Services] and terrorist ties.
After the Gulf War, Saddam's terrorism had continued in violation of UNSCR 687, and in an address to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon staff on February 17, 1998, President Clinton warned of "the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed".

On June 26, 2000, Vice President Gore, the presumptive Democratic Party candidate for President, reaffirmed his and President Clinton's commitment to Iraqi regime change:
The INC [Iraqi National Congress] and the Vice President reaffirmed their joint desire to see a united Iraq served by a representative and democratic government responsive to the needs of its people and willing to live in peace with its neighbors.
The Vice President reaffirmed the Administration's strong commitment to the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and to bringing him and his inner circle to justice for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. Saddam's removal is the key to the positive transformation of Iraq's relationship with the international community and with the United States, in particular.

On July 3, 2003, President Clinton supported his successor by citing to Clinton's own experience with the Saddam problem:
Let me tell you what I know. When I left office, there was a substantial amount of biological and chemical material unaccounted for. ... So I thought it was prudent for the president to go to the U.N. and for the U.N. to say you got to let these inspectors in, and this time if you don't cooperate the penalty could be regime change, not just continued sanctions. I mean, we're all more sensitive to any possible stocks of chemical and biological weapons. ... it is incontestable that on the day I left office, there were unaccounted for stocks of biological and chemical weapons.

And of course, on March 7, 2003, UNMOVIC reported to the UN Security Council, among other violations, "With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq." UNMOVIC's findings were the main trigger for OIF.

Therefore, given the Clinton administration view on Saddam's combined WMD/terrorism threat and commitment to Iraqi regime change before the 9/11 attacks, combined with UNMOVIC's confirmation of Iraq's continued breach of the UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates, it seems likely that a hypothetical President Gore - who would have been more sensitized to the Saddam problem from his experience as Vice President compared to President Bush - also would have pressed to conclusively resolve the Saddam problem in reaction to the 9/11 attacks.; ६/११/१५, ४:३१ PM
Robert Cook म्हणाले...: "There is no domestic legal controversy over OIF. According to American law, the entire Iraq intervention, including current operations, has been legal."

Of course there was no domestic legal controversy of OIL. We do what we want! Criminals don't check with each other to confirm whether action they are about to take is legal or not...and they certainly don't seek permission from the police or courts! If our invasion of Iraq was legal because we say so, then Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was legal because he said so, and any nation's invasion of any nation is legal because they say so.

There was certainly international controversy over the legality of our invasion, with many parties asserting it to be illegal.

According to American law, the invasion of Iraq was illegal...at least, if the Constitution still has any legitimacy.

See Article VI, section 2:

"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

The UN Charter prohibits member nations from making war against other nations--or even threatening to make war as a coercive measure--and the initiation of war is permitted only with the UN Security Council vote approving the motion, or if the nation in question is facing an imminent attack and has an urgent self-defense necessity. We are not just a member nation of the UN, but one of the founding nations, and a member of the UN Security Council, and signatories to the UN Charter.

We did not have UN Security Council approval to invade Iraq, and we did not have a self-defense justification to launch the invasion, so the invasion violated our treaty obligation--the "supreme law of the land,"--and was illegal. It was simply aggressive war, the greatest of war crimes under the Nuremberg standards.; ६/११/१५, ४:४७ PM
Robert Cook म्हणाले...: "What purpose did we have in remaining longer? Well. what do you suppose would have happened to the Republic of Korea if we'd told them in 1958, 'OK, boys, we've done about all we can here. Best of luck'?"

You know...we should have thought of the before invading. If we had never toppled Hussein, there would not have been a problem. We created the hellhole that is Iraq today, and much of the middle east. We blew open Pandora's Box when we decided to illegally invade Iraq and destroy their government.

The real question: what purpose did we have in invading Iraq in the first place? The answer is contained in the acronym for the first name of our invasion of Iraq: OIL.; ६/११/१५, ४:५४ PM
Bleach Drinkers Curing Coronavirus Together म्हणाले...: ही टिप्पणी लेखकाना हलविली आहे.; ६/११/१५, ६:४९ PM
Bleach Drinkers Curing Coronavirus Together म्हणाले...: "I think my dad, like a lot of people that love George, want to try to create a different narrative, perhaps, just because that’s natural to do."

The way Republicans to want to make up a fictional narrative about America. Because they love it and that's the "natural" thing to do.; ६/११/१५, ६:५० PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Robert Cook,

You raise 3 issues: first, the national security evaluation that warrants military deployment; second, the substantive issue of Iraq's breach of the Gulf War ceasefire; and third, the procedural issue of authorization to act upon Iraq's breach of the Gulf War ceasefire.

First, "imminent self-defense necessity" is just your arbitrary and unusually narrow assertion. That's not an actual national security bar the President is required to meet in order to deploy the military. Recall that the standing national security evaluation of the Saddam problem even before the 9/11 attacks compelled reevaluation of Saddam's combined WMD/terrorism threat stood at, "Iraqi actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" (Clinton, 28JUL00).

Before OIF, the US military already had been multiply deployed to Iraq throughout 1991 to 2003 under P.L. 102-1 et al pursuant to UNSCR 678 et al.

Second, on the substantive issue, Iraq's breach of the Gulf War ceasefire was confirmed at the decision point for OIF.

You've misunderstood the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections. Suffice to say, the burden of proof was always on Iraq to prove disarmament as mandated by UNSCR 687 et al. There was no burden of proof on the UN weapons inspectors to seek out verification of the predictive precision of the pre-war intelligence. UNMOVIC, in fact, confirmed Iraq failed to prove disarmament as mandated for casus belli.

For the correct understanding of the UNSCR 1441 inspections, see the answer to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections?".

Third, on the procedural issue, I repeat, there is an international legal controversy over OIF, but it was the same international legal controversy over the no-fly zones and Operation Desert Fox. Again, see the answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal?" linked at 11/6/15, 12:29 PM.

If you prefer a somewhat denser, more technical explanation, go here. Excerpt:
When Iraq failed to comply in its "final opportunity to comply", President Bush faced the same deadlock in the Security Council that President Clinton faced for Operation Desert Fox, and Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom followed Clinton's legal precedent with ODF.

Although there is language to argue the claim that new UN authorization was required for each enforcement action, at the same time, UNSCR 1441 carried forward the standing authorization provided by UNSCR 678:
Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

In other words, a new UN authorization may have been politically desirable, but it was no more legally necessary in 2003 for OIF than it was legally necessary in 1998 for ODF.; ६/११/१५, ७:१६ PM
JPS म्हणाले...: Robert Cook,

If we had just wanted Iraq's oil, we would have done as Chiraq did: cut a deal to keep it flowing, and done what we could to keep a pliant dictator in place.

Someone may well have thought to call the campaign "Operation Iraqi Liberation," and been overruled on the grounds that having the acronym OIL would give needless satisfaction to the "No Blood for Oil!" Crowd. It does not follow, as you seem to be gloating, that this shows it was all about the oil in the first place.

We have done a lot to unleash the chaos in Iraq today. That is a terrible thing. I am less convinced that everything would be significantly better if Saddam Hussein or his even more loathsome sons were in power today. After all, if only we'd left the Baathists in power, Iraq might be as stable as Syria today.

(Let me guess: Syria would be perfectly stable if we hadn't invaded Iraq, right?); ६/११/१५, ७:४२ PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Robert Cook:
"If we had never toppled Hussein, there would not have been a problem."

Incorrect. Saddam was a problem.

Recall that the Iraq intervention per the Gulf War ceasefire mandates included strong humanitarian grounds.

To wit, the UN Commission on Human Rights (2002):
The [United Nations] Commission on Human Rights … Recalling: … [UNSCR] 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, in which the Council demanded an end to repression of the Iraqi civilian population and insisted that Iraq cooperate with humanitarian organizations and that the human rights of all Iraqi citizens be respected … Strongly condemns: (a) The systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror.

Along with Saddam's terroristic rule in breach of UNSCR 688, his regime was a global leader of terrorism, which breached UNSCR 687.

To wit, the Iraqi Perspectives Project (2007):
Captured Iraqi documents have uncovered evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. ... Though the execution of Iraqi terror plots was not always successful, evidence shows that Saddam�s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime.

More from IPP author and researcher, James Lacey, about Saddam's terrorism here.; ६/११/१५, ७:४५ PM
elcee म्हणाले...: JPS:
"If we had just wanted Iraq's oil, we would have done as Chiraq did: cut a deal to keep it flowing, and done what we could to keep a pliant dictator in place."

Right - the Oil for Food scandal funded Saddam's illicit military reconstitution efforts in breach of UNSCR 687 that included WMD-related programs. The complicity of UNSC members in the Oil for Food scandal factored into Saddam's calculus that he could defeat the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, including UNSCR 687, without proving compliance as mandated.

Robert Cook's view is ahistorical on its face. OIF did not take place at the turn of the 20th century, when autarkic military claims were in vogue. It's long established practice to buy petroleum products on the global market.

Moreover, Robert Cook's view is backwards. Saddam did not withhold Iraq's oil from the US. Saddam desired to sell Iraq's oil to the US and everyone else. In fact, until they were subverted in the Oil for Food scandal, the US sanctions enforcing the UNSCR 660-series resolutions were the chief obstacle for Saddam's desire to sell Iraq's oil to the US and everyone else.

I'm nonplussed that opponents as well as supporters are ignorant about the reasons for OIF. There's little room for speculation. The explanation for the 'why' of the Iraq intervention is straightforward based on primary sources that are easily accessed on-line, such as the Gulf War ceasefire UN Security Council resolutions that set the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), the US law and policy to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235), the conditions and precedents that set the stage for OIF, and the determinative fact findings of Iraq's breach of ceasefire that triggered enforcement.

Yet some people seem to studiously ignore the primary sources of the mission in order to assert a demonstrably false narrative.; ६/११/१५, ८:२७ PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Robert Cook,

I'll add for academic purposes: the US relationship with the United Nations does not supersede US sovereign authority, including as exercised for US national security interests.

That being said, the Iraq intervention since 1990-1991 has been distinctive in that regard because the relevant US law and policy, most notably P.L. 102-1 (1991) and P.L. 107-243 (2002), authorized enforcement of the mandates for Iraq that were set by the UNSCR 660-series resolutions.

However, the President's authority to enforce Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660-series resolutions has always been - and can only be - US sovereign authority.; ६/११/१५, ८:५४ PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Robert Cook:
"They had only completed four months of inspections--during which time they found no WMD or evidence of extant WMD programs."

Actually, UNMOVIC discharged its mandate from UNSCR 1441 with the report of its findings to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003.

See the UNMOVIC Cluster Document ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes", fact sheet), presented to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003 pursuant to UNSCR 687 via UNSCR 1441, that triggered the final decision for OIF.

The UNMOVIC update was actually 2-6 weeks late, depending on how you count the inspection period mandated by UNSCR 1441. To understand the "four months of inspections" in correct context, recall that President Clinton had ordered Operation Desert Fox in response to the UNSCOM report of its findings based on a 3 week inspection period. That amount of time was sufficient because the UN weapons inspectors were not tasked to scour Iraq to find WMD according to the pre-war intelligence. Rather, Saddam was required to prove to the UN weapons inspectors that Iraq disarmed as mandated by UNSCR 687 et al. Merely "allowing in the UN weapons inspectors" did not meet the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) for disarmament - not in 1991-1992 and not in 2002-2003.

Again, you've misunderstood the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections. For the correct understanding of the UNSCR 1441 inspections, see the answer to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections?".

Related, also see the answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq?".; ७/११/१५, १:१० AM
BN म्हणाले...: Robert Kook: Leave the bad guys alone.

Robert Kook: Leave Hitler alone.

This is a real question. When do we intervene?; ७/११/१५, १:१६ AM
elcee म्हणाले...: BN:
"This is a real question. When do we intervene?"

In the case of Iraq, we had intervened in a continuous course since 1990-1991 in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and then enforcement of the terms of the Gulf War ceasefire with the UNSCR 660-series resolutions. See President HW Bush's policy statements from the beginning of the Iraq intervention in 1990-1991.

In 2002-2003, the trigger for enforcement - ie, the credible threat of regime change - was reiterated as Iraq continuing its breach of the Gulf War ceasefire by violating any of the terms mandated in the UNSCR 660-series resolutions, especially UNSCRs 687 and 688, et al.

The first step for Iraq to switch off enforcement was proving "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991)" with the requirement that "Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA" (UNSCR 1441).

Saddam was notified it was his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).

Contrary to Robert Cook's incorrect assertion that Saddam "allowing in the UN weapons inspectors" qualified as the mandated cooperation, as Hans Blix clarified, "Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can"" (UNSC, 27JAN03).

So, when do we intervene?

In 2002-2003, it was when UNMOVIC reported "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003 - eg, "UNMOVIC has credible information that the total quantity of BW [biological weapon] agent in bombs, warheads and in bulk at the time of the Gulf War was 7,000 litres more than declared by Iraq [and] ... With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq" (UNMOVIC Cluster Document).

The UNMOVIC Cluster Document confirmed that "Iraq ... remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 ... Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein" (UNSCR 1441).

Far from "they found no WMD or evidence of extant WMD programs" (Robert Cook), the UNMOVIC findings of Iraqi disarmament violations triggered Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 in the same way that the UNSCOM Butler Report confirmed Iraq's material breach and triggered Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.; ७/११/१५, ५:३० PM
elcee म्हणाले...: Excerpt from Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ:

On January 28, 2004, David Kay, who preceded Charles Duelfer as head of the Iraq Survey Group, reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee:
In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.; १२/११/१५, ८:४५ PM