tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post9185850926240199533..comments2024-03-29T08:56:40.289-05:00Comments on Althouse: "Is it the policy of the State Department, where the preservation or the secrecy of secret negotiations is concerned, to lie in order to achieve that goal?"Ann Althousehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01630636239933008807noreply@blogger.comBlogger60125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-78234562111104283792016-06-03T13:48:18.563-05:002016-06-03T13:48:18.563-05:00Me to Rusty:
"What's HJR114?"
Duh. ...Me to Rusty:<br />"What's HJR114?"<br /><br />Duh. You're referring to the earlier version of Public Law 107-243. I thought you were referring to a fact finding that I didn't know about. My mistake.<br /><br />Anyway, again, you're correct that "Hussein was amassing materials to build WMDs" in breach of UNSCR 687. <br /><br /><a href="https://t.co/tbXnF3HXDU#whyleavecontainment" rel="nofollow">Excerpts</a> from the ISG report:<br />"<i>From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency. <br />... Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem. The only notable items stopped in this flow were some aluminum tubes, which became the center of debate over the existence of a nuclear enrichment effort in Iraq. Major items had no trouble getting across the border, including 380 liquid-fuel rocket engines. Indeed, Iraq was designing missile systems with the assumption that sanctioned material would be readily available.<br />... The procurement programs supporting Iraq’s WMD programs and prohibited conventional military equipment purchases were financed via a supplemental budget process that occurred outside of the publicized national and defense budgets.</i>"elceehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13774506000361028739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-60606605782017918922016-06-03T12:59:32.770-05:002016-06-03T12:59:32.770-05:00Rusty:
"It is believed,, via Israeli intellig...Rusty:<br />"It is believed,, via Israeli intelligence, that many BW materials were delivered to Syria."<br /><br />Indeed, in the operative context that Iraq evidentially failed its burden to prove it complied and disarmed as mandated by UNSCRs 687 and 1441, UNMOVIC and Iraq Survey Group left the door open - <i>wide</i> open - for the possibility that Saddam concealed elements of his WMD program, especially his BW program. <br /><br />UNMOVIC noted in the fact record in its 06MAR03 report, "A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF IRAQ’S PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES", that "Of all its proscribed weapons programmes, Iraq’s biological warfare (BW) programme was perhaps the most secretive." <br /><br />Of the 4 proscribed WMD areas (nuclear, biological, chemical, missile), Saddam's BW program was the most compartmentalized, portable, concealable, etc. <br /><br />In fact, the Iraq Survey Group found a number of indications of an undeclared covert BW program that had been "sanitized", plus ready BW-convertible dual-use items and activity. <br /><br />Excerpts from the ISG report:<br />"<i>[The] following are of particular concern, as they relate to the possibility of a retained BW [biological weapons] capability or the ability to initiate a new one. <br />• ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s stocks of bulk BW agents remaining after Desert Storm and subsequent unilateral destruction. There is a very limited chance that continuing investigation may provide evidence to resolve this issue. <br />• The fate of the missing bulk agent storage tanks. <br />• The fate of a portion of Iraq’s BW agent seed-stocks. <br />• The nature, purpose and who was involved in the <b>secret biological work in the small IIS laboratories</b> discovered by ISG.<br />...<br /> <b>The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting</b> of its production and use of BW agent simulants—specifically Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus lichenformis, Bacillus megaterium and Bacillus thuringiensis <b>to be inadequate</b>. ISG remains interested in simulant work because these items may be used not only to simulate the dispersion of BW agents, develop production techniques, and optimize storage conditions, but also <b>the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent</b>.</i>"<br /><br />Today, Saddam's BW program remains an open question. <br /><br />Similarly, although it did not uncover "militarily significant WMD stocks", the ISG investigation also could not foreclose the possibility that Saddam possessed WMD stocks or the possibility of unfound WMD stocks, such as the UNSCR 687-proscribed CW munitions confiscated in Operation Avarice. Again, under the terms of the Gulf War ceasefire, Iraq was obligated to provide a total verified declaration that accounted for its entire WMD program, including all stocks, and yield all proscribed items to the UN inspectors for elimination under international supervision; Saddam did not. <br /><br />Excerpt from the ISG report:<br />"<i>ISG’s investigation of Iraq’s ammunition supply points—ammunition depots, field ammunition supply points (FASPs), tactical FASPs, and other dispersed weapons caches—has not uncovered any CW munitions. <b>ISG investigation, however, was hampered by several factors beyond our control.</b> The scale and complexity of Iraqi munitions handling, storage, and weapons markings, and <b>extensive looting and destruction at military facilities</b> during OIF significantly limited the number of munitions that ISG was able to thoroughly inspect.<br />• ISG technical experts fully evaluated <b>less than one quarter of one percent</b> of the over 10,000 weapons caches throughout Iraq, and visited fewer than ten ammunition depots identified prior to OIF as suspect CW sites.<br />• The enormous number of munitions dispersed throughout the country may include some older, CW-filled munitions, and <b>ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq</b>.</i>"elceehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13774506000361028739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-51332840493735732952016-06-03T11:46:14.472-05:002016-06-03T11:46:14.472-05:00elcee,
Yeah, maybe. Not relevant to the post, tho...elcee,<br /><br />Yeah, maybe. Not relevant to the post, though.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-26611772626801772892016-06-03T11:44:38.553-05:002016-06-03T11:44:38.553-05:00Bobby:
"However, I disagree with you all that...Bobby:<br />"However, I disagree with you all that undeclared WMDs were located."<br /><br />That's because you're applying your own <i>ad hoc</i>, inapposite definitions for "undeclared" and "WMDs" rather than the relevant definitions of the terms per the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) for disarmament. elceehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13774506000361028739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-64810295025882726082016-06-03T11:37:24.482-05:002016-06-03T11:37:24.482-05:00elcee, Rusty,
I'm in full agreement with you ...elcee, Rusty,<br /><br />I'm in full agreement with you guys that Iraq was responsible for complying with the terms of the various UNSCRs (660, 661, 678, 686, 687, 688, 707, 715, 986, 1284 and 1441). I agree that Saddam Hussein was in material breach of said resolutions and that, under US understanding of 1441's "serious consequences" (which admittedly differed from some others, such as the French), the US-led coalition had the authority to initiate OIF. However, I disagree with you all that undeclared WMDs were located. Failure to comply with UNSCR 1441 =/= possession of undeclared WMDs (though for ultimate consequences, they would be treated the same). <br /><br />Now, to get back on track with this post, let's change the objectionable phrasing to: "Like, I suspect that Condy Rice and Colin Powell were being honest when they stated their belief that Iraq had undeclared weapons of mass destruction. According to their own (perhaps mistaken) admissions, however, they now believe that to have been erroneous. Thus, within the framework of their subsequent statements, they would have been honest, but erroneous." There. No more need to have this non-germane side discussion about whether or not undeclared WMDs were located in Iraq, and we can get back to the actual post.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-62245042738463353892016-06-03T11:21:28.293-05:002016-06-03T11:21:28.293-05:00Rusty:
"It is my understanding ... that Husse...Rusty:<br />"It is my understanding ... that Hussein was amassing materials to build WMDs."<br /><br />Correct. See the <a href="https://t.co/tbXnF3HXDU#whyleavecontainment" rel="nofollow">answer</a> to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)?".<br /><br />What's HJR114?elceehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13774506000361028739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-69000236327737788702016-06-03T11:08:45.723-05:002016-06-03T11:08:45.723-05:00Bobby:
"Please note that I have consistently ...Bobby:<br />"Please note that I have consistently used the term "undeclared weapons of mass destruction" (bold added for emphasis) -- that's an important distinction, of course, because I'm well aware of the declared substances that were recovered by the Coalition (some while I was there, in fact)."<br /><br />From the text of his comment, Rusty is talking about undeclared UNSCR 687-proscribed items and activity.<br /><br />FYI, the nuclear disarmament-related political controversy is cleared up <a href="http://tinyurl.com/hcdhxsc#nuclear" rel="nofollow">here</a>, citing to the Iraq Survey Group. <br /><br />While Saddam was not "strictly" (PL 107-243) in "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) regarding the nuclear disarmament mandates, the IAEA nuclear-related findings in the UNSCR 1441 inspections were not as alarming as the UNMOVIC chemical, biological, and missile-related findings that were the principal trigger for Operation Iraqi Freedom. <br /><br />That being said, according to the "strict" enforcement standard of UNSCR 1441 and the 2002 AUMF, Saddam was in fact noncompliant with (in breach of) the UNSCR 687 nuclear disarmament mandates, in addition to Iraq's noncompliance with the UNSCR 687 chemical, biological, and missile disarmament mandates. ISG confirmed the presence of UNSCR 687-proscribed nuclear-related intent and activity.elceehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13774506000361028739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-9641391610063685762016-06-03T11:00:54.219-05:002016-06-03T11:00:54.219-05:00It is my understanding of HJR114 that Hussein was ...It is my understanding of HJR114 that Hussein was amassing materials to build WMDs. It is an established fact he had WMDs since he used them on his own people. Hence the yellowcake and nickel and centrifuges.Rustyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00938263272237104128noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-90125291724239096812016-06-03T10:38:30.730-05:002016-06-03T10:38:30.730-05:00Bobby,
FYI, Iraq's unaccounted for unilateral...Bobby,<br /><br />FYI, Iraq's unaccounted for unilateral destruction of WMD was by definition "undeclared weapons of mass destruction". <br /><br />The UNSCR 687 declaration mandate did not place a burden on the US and UN to prove Iraq was armed according to intelligence estimates. The UNSCR 687 declaration mandate placed the burden on Iraq to establish a fully verified account of its entire WMD program. The verification by the UNSCR 687 Special Commission of the mandated disclosure by Iraq of its entire WMD program and, thereby fully accounted for, the elimination of all UNSCR 687-proscribed items and permanent termination of all UNSCR-687 proscribed activity under international supervision were elements of the UNSCR 687 declaration mandate. <br /><br />It's apparent that you fundamentally misunderstood the Gulf War ceasefire UNSCR 687 disarmament process. To correct your misconception, see the <a href="https://t.co/tbXnF3HXDU#inspectionsenoughtime" rel="nofollow">answer</a> to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections?"<br /><br />As Secretary Powell explained in his 05FEB03 UNSC speech, there was no burden on the US and UN to prove Iraq's proscribed armament. The question of "Where is Iraq's WMD?" was never for the US and UN to answer. It was always a question Saddam was required to answer in compliance with the UNSCR 687-mandated declare/yield/eliminate-under-international-supervision procedure, which was reinforced by the "enhanced inspection regime" mandated by UNSCR 1441.<br /><br /><b>Bobby</b>:<br />"I'll email him your post and let him know that he doesn't know what he's talking about. Thanks for the tip!"<br /><br />Please do. Like I said, knowing what we know now, the evidence shows that the main points of Powell's case presentation against Saddam are validated nearly across the board.<br /><br />He and I would unpack his 05FEB03 UNSC speech point by point in light of the fact record and findings of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC, IAEA, the Iraq Survey Group, the Iraqi Perspectives Project (re terrorism), and the UN Commission on Human Rights, in the operative context of the Congressional instruction to "ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) pursuant the UN mandate to "ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions ... the <b>governing standard of Iraqi compliance</b> ... with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council" (UNSCR 1441). <br /><br /><b>Bobby</b>:<br />"the stated belief that Iraq had undeclared weapons of mass destruction- as far as all the evidence we now have- turned out to be not correct;"<br /><br />You keep saying that, despite that your view is demonstrably false according to the fact record and findings and the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). <br /><br /><b>Bobby</b>:<br />"if you have evidence to the contrary, that is if you have actual evidence of Iraq being in possession of undeclared weapons of mass destruction (and not just that it's possible they could have had undeclared WMDs), please do let me know"<br /><br />That's easy. Again, see the quoted excerpts in my comment on 6/2/16, 4:22 PM, and go <a href="http://tinyurl.com/hcdhxsc#intel" rel="nofollow">here</a> to learn about the fact record for the Gulf War ceasefire UNSCR 687 disarmament process and the Iraq Survey Group.<br /><br />From beginning to end, the Saddam regime evidentially failed to comply and disarm as mandated by the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) enforced under US law.elceehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13774506000361028739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-15617712437775551072016-06-03T10:22:34.803-05:002016-06-03T10:22:34.803-05:00Oh, one correction for the record, because I worry...Oh, one correction for the record, because I worry that people are taking me literally: when I referred to Robert Jervis above as the CIA's resident historian, I was speaking metaphorically. Jervis, who is a Professor of International Politics at Columbia, is Chair of the CIA's Historical Review Panel and occasionally comments on H-Net, but he is technically a political scientist by training, not a historian, and resides in New York, not Langley. That is all.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-85403740579994844522016-06-03T09:56:59.734-05:002016-06-03T09:56:59.734-05:00Ugh. Posted three times, deleted the first two. So...Ugh. Posted three times, deleted the first two. Sorry, Ann.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-16233358810351629952016-06-03T09:55:13.370-05:002016-06-03T09:55:13.370-05:00Rusty,
Please note that I have consistently used ...Rusty,<br /><br />Please note that I have consistently used the term "<b>undeclared</b> weapons of mass destruction" (<b>bold</b> added for emphasis) -- that's an important distinction, of course, because I'm well aware of the <b>declared</b> substances that were recovered by the Coalition (some while I was there, in fact). FactCheck.org, for example, <a href="www.factcheck.org/2008/08/uranium-in-iraq/" rel="nofollow">has covered this before</a> and in greater detail than I intend to do here.<br /><br />We're getting well off-track from my point about a lie requiring intent to deceive and the concept of "honest, but erroneous" not necessarily equating with a lie. I honestly have no interest in trying to convince you or elcee or anyone anything about whether or not there actually were or were not undeclared weapons of mass destruction in Iraq all along. Having reviewed tons (literally) of supporting intelligence documents as part of my professional life, I happen to believe that Bush, Powell, Rice and Co. were not lying, because intelligence failures caused them to truly believe there were undeclared WMDs in Iraq, hence there was no intent to deceive ("honest, but erroenous"). If you want to believe undeclared WMDs were there all along, as far as I'm concerned, you're perfectly free to do so- that happens to be a position not shared by Bush, Powell, Rice and Co., but that's okay. But whether you want to agree with me, or whether you want to believe undeclared WMDs were passed to Syria or vaporized by Martians or absconded by Ultron's robotic minions, I have about as much interest in trying to change your mind as I do with a Leftist who, despite not having conducted any research or being familiar with any of the various investigations, nonetheless "<b>knows</b>" Bush <b>lied</b>.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-45957941243218471852016-06-03T09:54:34.615-05:002016-06-03T09:54:34.615-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-11576995079232756242016-06-03T09:54:22.011-05:002016-06-03T09:54:22.011-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-35529346280238383292016-06-03T09:07:11.467-05:002016-06-03T09:07:11.467-05:00550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium. 4000 artill...550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium. 4000 artillery shells with sarin or sarin residue. One high precision centrifuge with material to manufacture more. Several tons of nickel sponge( needed to refine uranium ore). These are items NOT found by the IAEI<br />This was reported by the military as the units captured different areas. It is believed,, via Israeli intelligence, that many BW materials were delivered to Syria.<br />Rustyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00938263272237104128noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-49841307092862275332016-06-03T00:30:29.340-05:002016-06-03T00:30:29.340-05:00Qwinn,
"Bobby, it's clear you think that...Qwinn,<br /><br />"<i>Bobby, it's clear you think that was a devastating response. I'm not sure why. Either Powell was paying attention to the wrong intelligence then, or he's paying the wrong attention now. You seem to think it's blazingly obvious that he was wrong before and he's right now. I see no logical reason to believe that is more likely. It is, however, quite logical that you would pick the one that comports to what you want to believe, and present it to us as if anything else is utterly idiotic, because progs gotta prog.</i>"<br /><br />First, I never said that Powell was "wrong" before. What I said was: "I suspect that Condy Rice and Colin Powell were being honest when they stated their belief that Iraq had undeclared weapons of mass destruction- after all, they were relying upon a National Intelligence Estimate that told them so. Clearly, however, that was erroneous - honest, but erroneous." That's not the same thing, though I understand it might appear so to you and will try to explain the difference in a moment.<br /><br />Second, the stated belief that Iraq had undeclared weapons of mass destruction- as far as all the evidence we now have- turned out to be not correct; if you have evidence to the contrary, that is if you have actual evidence of Iraq being in possession of undeclared weapons of mass destruction (and not just that it's possible they could have had undeclared WMDs), <b>please</b> do let me know as this would be of great interest to several members of the intelligence community. However, Powell's belief- although ultimately incorrect- was nonetheless genuinely-, not deceitfully-, held; it was based on an output generated by the intelligence process, and intelligence is a matter of probabilities and possibilities, not certainties, and will not always be completely (or even mostly) accurate (most everyone seems to understand this point, except Democrats when a Republican is in the White House or Republicans with a Democrat in the White House, in which case any false reading can only be interpreted as deliberate deception). <br /><br />Third, Powell was not paying attention to the "wrong" intelligence back then- he was paying attention to <b>the</b> intelligence then. For those familiar with the intelligence process back then, this is self-evident. For those not familiar, suffice to say that the process was set up back then to yield <b>an</b> intelligence estimate, and not necessarily allowing the aggregation of dissenting analyses to contribute to a larger, comprehensive, and therefore more nuanced assessment. (For those actually interested in greater detail, I would recommend reading the CIA's resident historian, Robert Jervis's <i>Why Intelligence Fails</i> (available <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Why-Intelligence-Fails-Revolution-Security/dp/0801478065?imprToken=z6mxtUIiI9m8UTOWWHfR4w&tag=althouse09-20&linkCode=w13&linkId=IFNQD6FYIV3JIVSQ&ref_=assoc_res_sw_us_dka_crp_c_result_1&ref-refURL=http%3A%2F%2Falthouse.blogspot.com%2F" rel="nofollow">here</a> from the Althouse portal)). Powell alludes to this both in the Barbara Walters interview I linked to above, and also in his 2012 book, <i>It Worked For Me</i> (available <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Worked-Me-Life-Leadership/dp/0062135139?imprToken=z6mxtUIiI9m8UTOWWHfR4w&tag=althouse09-20&linkCode=w13&linkId=IFNQD6FYIV3JIVSQ&ref_=assoc_res_sw_us_dka_crp_c_result_1&ref-refURL=http%3A%2F%2Falthouse.blogspot.com%2F" rel="nofollow">here</a> through the Althouse portal), when he talks about his frustration that certain intelligence analysts <b>knew</b> his UN presentation was based off false intelligence, but failed to inform him (in fairness to them, the system was not set up to allow them to feed the information outside of their chain of command-- much of this was fixed by Negroponte and Fingar during their reforms, though humans have found a way to pervert the process in other ways).Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-81166155357971434722016-06-02T21:50:34.810-05:002016-06-02T21:50:34.810-05:00Sorry, as these threads load at the bottom, I have...Sorry, as these threads load at the bottom, I have a tendency to read them backwards. I retract the "progs gotta prog", I don't see evidence of that yet. My point about Powell being right once and wrong once doesn't narrow down which is which stands, though.Qwinnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11551344511722159981noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-15289061169664244562016-06-02T21:39:18.869-05:002016-06-02T21:39:18.869-05:00Bobby, it's clear you think that was a devasta...Bobby, it's clear you think that was a devastating response. I'm not sure why. Either Powell was paying attention to the wrong intelligence then, or he's paying the wrong attention now. You seem to think it's blazingly obvious that he was wrong before and he's right now. I see no logical reason to believe that is more likely. It is, however, quite logical that you would pick the one that comports to what you want to believe, and present it to us as if anything else is utterly idiotic, because progs gotta prog.Qwinnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11551344511722159981noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-3428869600699125292016-06-02T17:40:02.300-05:002016-06-02T17:40:02.300-05:00elcee,
"Actually, Secretary of State Powell&...elcee,<br /><br />"<i>Actually, Secretary of State Powell's 05FEB03 speech at the UN Security Council holds up well. Knowing what we know now, the main points of his case presentation against Saddam are validated nearly across the board.</i>"<br /><br />Well, then someone needs to tell that to Colin Powell ASAP, because he told Barbara Walters that presentation was a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/09/politics/powell-calls-his-un-speech-a-lasting-blot-on-his-record.html?_r=0" rel="nofollow">that it was the result of intelligence failures and a "blot" on his record</a>. I'll email him your post and let him know that he doesn't know what he's talking about. Thanks for the tip!Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-58069780603069259072016-06-02T16:51:08.181-05:002016-06-02T16:51:08.181-05:00mikee,
"Bobby, all that could be done via a ...mikee,<br /><br />"<i>Bobby, all that could be done via a kiosk in foreign cities with a videophone link to offices in DC, or even offices in New Delhi.</i>"<br /><br />No, actually, all of it could not. But even if you think it could because you know little of what that work entails and only went by the few things I enumerated (and to be clear, it still couldn't), the "etc. etc." is apparently much broader than you actually realize. Just a handful of the "etc. etc." at an Embassy would include most (if not all) of the following (I'm just going to give you the wave-tops): the FBI's LEGATT is cooperating with host nation law enforcement to advance US interests, ICITAP is building the capacity of local law enforcement, OPDAT is building the capacity of local prosecutors; the DEA is doing what the DEA does; the FAS is collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information about global supply and demand, trade trends, and market opportunities and improving market access for U.S. products; the US Commercial Service is conducting business matchmaking, market intelligence, trade advocacy and commercial diplomacy; Treasury is observing, enforcing and reporting on financial sanctions and implementing the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program; the development professionals (USAID and the Peace Corps country staff) are managing their personnel and programs; there's the aforementioned Consular Services and Public Diplomacy; and all of the security, IT, management, and health support that go into keeping all the rest of it afloat. And that's just the wave-tops (believe me, I could go into much, much more detail on what the above offices do, as well as other offices I haven't bothered to bring up like the Defense Attache and the Office of Military Cooperation).<br /><br />Not to mention, if all of that were magically done via internet connections from DC to the host nation (and it would take magic), think about how much easier would it be for the locals to play "spot the spook" with our intelligence operatives when they're ALL spies! and- oh, yeah (lest you think, well, we'd just use front companies like the real world is some ridiculous Hollywood spy novel)- without diplomatic protection, our unfortunate intel operatives that get picked up would have no protections, and could luck retaining personnel.<br /><br />My guess is that your friend was exaggerating for humor and didn't intend for you to take him literally.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-87054986901392436122016-06-02T16:44:57.625-05:002016-06-02T16:44:57.625-05:00Add: The role of the IIS in Saddam's covert UN...Add: The role of the IIS in Saddam's covert UNSCR 687-proscribed WMD program that was uncovered by ISG - "The IIS ran a large covert procurement program, undeclared chemical laboratories, and supported denial and deception operations" (ISG) - is especially striking because the IIS doubled as the Saddam regime arm that managed Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (<a href="http://fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/" rel="nofollow">Iraqi Perspectives Project</a>). <br /><br />Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP) was, of course, a material breach of UNSCR 687, too, and a main element of the law and policy basis for OIF per Public Law 107-243, the 2002 AUMF.<br /><br />IPP, which analyzed captured Iraqi materials, found that "many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States. At times these organizations worked together, trading access for capability" - "Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda" - "Because Saddam's security organizations and Osama bin Laden's terrorist network operated with similar aims (at least in the short term), considerable overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the same outside groups" - "evidence shows that Saddam's use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime".<br /><br />IPP also reported, "One question remains regarding Iraq's terrorism capability: <i>Is there anything in the captured archives to indicate that Saddam had the will to use his terrorist capabilities directly against United States?</i> Judging from examples of Saddam's statements (Extract 34) before the 1991 Gulf War with the United States, <b>the answer is yes</b>."elceehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13774506000361028739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-30196421914860858912016-06-02T16:22:22.342-05:002016-06-02T16:22:22.342-05:00Bobby:
"Like, I suspect that Condy Rice and C...Bobby:<br />"Like, I suspect that Condy Rice and Colin Powell were being honest when they stated their belief that Iraq had undeclared weapons of mass destruction- after all, they were relying upon a National Intelligence Estimate that told them so. Clearly, however, that was erroneous - honest, but erroneous."<br /><br />Actually, Secretary of State Powell's 05FEB03 speech at the UN Security Council <a href="http://tinyurl.com/z92jkp6#powellunsc" rel="nofollow">holds up</a> well. Knowing what we know now, the main points of his case presentation against Saddam are validated nearly across the board.<br /><br />That being said, your assertion is incorrect on premise and fact. <br /><br />On premise, the belief of Iraq's proscribed armament was not due primarily to the intelligence. Rather, the belief was rooted in the fact record of the Gulf War ceasefire UNSCR 687 disarmament process. In fact, many key assessments in the intelligence were based on the UN inspections and the related fact record.<br /><br />For example, the 06MAR03 UNMOVIC report, which was the principal trigger for Operation Iraqi Freedom, informed the UN Security Council that "UNSCOM considered that the evidence was insufficient to support Iraq’s statements on the quantity of anthrax destroyed and where or when it was destroyed" - "UNMOVIC has credible information that the total quantity of BW agent in bombs, warheads and in bulk at the time of the Gulf War was 7,000 litres more than declared by Iraq" - "With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq". <br /><br />More about the UNSCR 687-based fact record <a href="http://tinyurl.com/hcdhxsc#intel" rel="nofollow">here</a>.<br /><br />With the established fact of ceasefire-proscribed armament, Iraq's guilt was presumed in the ceasefire disarmament process until cured with the mandated compliance and disarmament. In Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), UNMOVIC reported "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues", which meant Iraq failed to meet its burden to prove the mandated compliance and disarmament, and therefore, Iraq's presumed guilt of proscribed armament continued.<br /><br />On fact, knowing what we know now, the post hoc Iraq Survey Group - although reporting that much evidence was lost before, during, and after the OIF invasion, suspect areas were "sanitized", and other practical limits to its investigation - corroborated UNMOVIC's confirmation that Iraq did not disarm as mandated by UNSCRs 687 and 1441: "ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs". <br /><br />ISG also found Iraq rife with undeclared WMD-related items and activity that were proscribed under UNSCR 687 - in other words, an undeclared active WMD program. <br /><br />For example, ISG found, "From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency" - "The procurement programs supporting Iraq’s WMD programs and prohibited conventional military equipment purchases were financed via a supplemental budget process that occurred outside of the publicized national and defense budgets" - "Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories...The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW [chemical weapons] agent R&D or small-scale production efforts" - "secret biological work in the small IIS laboratories discovered by ISG" - "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions...Outward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities".elceehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13774506000361028739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-44066268137568062212016-06-02T15:47:54.296-05:002016-06-02T15:47:54.296-05:00Bobby, all that could be done via a kiosk in forei...Bobby, all that could be done via a kiosk in foreign cities with a videophone link to offices in DC, or even offices in New Delhi.mikeehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17875483485290838207noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-19960889752567043002016-06-02T14:57:37.671-05:002016-06-02T14:57:37.671-05:00"James, I'm not going to comment on that...."James, I'm not going to comment on that. Next question please."<br /><br />The woman is shall we say under qualified for her job(s).Davidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17424384180201600935noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6329595.post-33561133916728575082016-06-02T13:31:00.235-05:002016-06-02T13:31:00.235-05:00mikee,
Haha, yeah, that's a pretty typical vi...mikee,<br /><br />Haha, yeah, that's a pretty typical view from the intelligence community, and I myself have probably said something similar several times. Don't get me wrong, I'm all about Condy Rice and Marc Grossman's concept of Transformational Diplomacy (vice traditional diplomacy). But obviously, it's not quite so simple: Americans abroad and foreign businessmen and aspiring tourists need Consular Services; the cultural programs administered by the public diplomacy crowd; the development community need a place to work; etc. etc., and none of those missions are likely to ever be taken up by the IC (at least, not without risking taking the IC's focus off the intelligence mission).<br /><br />The system "works," at least as much as one could expect from the government.Bobbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10887205004934304498noreply@blogger.com